THE CORPORATE GEOGRAPHY OF GLOBAL TERMINAL OPERATORS

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ABSTRACT:
The terminal and stevedoring industry has expanded substantially in recent years with the emergence of global container terminal operators controlling large multinational portfolios of terminal assets. This paper deals with the emerging corporate geography in the container terminal industry with issues related to the similarities or differences among terminal locations, the processes leading to the expansion of these holdings and the interactions they maintain as nodes within the global freight distribution system. It will be demonstrated that terminal operators show varying degrees of involvement in the main cargo handling markets around the world and that business cycles and a changing world economic geography can alter the geographical orientation of operators’ investment strategies. We unravel the corporate geography of leading firms such as HPH, PSA, DP World and APM Terminals, but also operators that are more regionally focused, such as Ports America, Eurogate, SSA Marine and ICTSI.

Keywords: terminal operators, geography, strategy, port, container

INTRODUCTION

1
Multinational enterprises (MNEs), as key drivers of globalization, have adopted flexible multi-firm organization structures on a wide variety of markets. Many of the world’s largest MNEs are regionally based in terms of breadth and depth of market coverage with most of their sales situated within their home leg of the ‘triad’, namely in North America, the European Union or Asia \(^1\). Additional risks of an economic, cultural, administrative or geographic nature hinder transnational companies from venturing into other regions outside the domestic markets \(^2\).

The relative importance of transnational companies varies considerably across industries. Maritime shipping has traditionally been one of the most multinational activities. While there is some regional orientation, many maritime shipping companies have established true global liner service networks \(^3\). A similar internationalization process took place in the port operation industry. From a dominantly regional structure, sometimes focused on a single port, several port terminal operators have established a multinational portfolio. This trend points to an emerging corporate geography in the container terminal sector with issues related to the similarities or differences among terminal locations, the processes leading to the expansion of these holdings and the interactions they maintain as nodes within the global freight distribution system \(^4\).

Using a corporate geography perspective, this paper deals with the geographical characteristics of the investment strategies of global terminal operators in the container industry. In line with the definition of global port operators in Bichou and Bell \(^5\), global terminals operators are defined as companies involved in international port terminal operations with a view of establishing globe-spanning network services. Several scholars have described the increasing complexity in terms of the actors involved in the terminal operating industry, the competition between these actors (e.g. \(^6\)) and the potentially diverging objectives and entry strategies of each of these actors. The observed complexity is linked to the heterogeneity in strategic paths among terminal operators as exemplified by the work of Olivier \(^7\) and differences in local market entry conditions (see e.g. \(^8\)). It will be demonstrated that global container terminal operators show varying degrees of involvement in the main cargo handling markets around the world.

The paper focuses on how global terminal networks emerged and to what extent the global terminal operators are really global. The first section presents a typology of global terminal operators and discusses recent development in throughput volumes of the leading actors in the container terminal industry. In a second section, the objectives and the entry and expansion strategies of the groups of global terminal operators
are analyzed. In parts three and four the spatial/geographical aspects related to the expansion strategies of global terminal operators are discussed, with a particular focus on factors affecting regional differences and the global portfolio of the actors involved. Part five analyzes the ramifications of the economic crisis (which started in late 2008) on the investment and operational strategies of global terminal operators. The last section examines the logistics strategies of global terminal operators.

**TYPOLOGY AND MARKET POSITIONS OF GLOBAL TERMINAL OPERATORS**

A strict categorization of terminal operating companies is difficult to establish. Bichou and Bell [5] propose a classification of global port operators based on four types of market players: (a) terminal-operating shippers (TOS) mainly active in non-containerized cargo operations; (b) terminal-operating shipping lines (TOSL) with terminals operated on a dedicated or a common-user basis; (c) terminal-operating port authorities (TOPA) and (d) terminal-operating companies (TOC). Olivier [7] and Olivier et al. [9] make a distinction between two types of transnational corporations in the terminal industry: international terminal operators (ITOs) whose core expertise is linked to terminal operations and ocean carriers whose core expertise is not in ports but vertically-related maritime shipping activities. Along the same lines, Slack and Frémont [10] use the terms transnational terminal operating companies (TTOs) and international shipping lines. Parola and Musso [6] define three groups: pure stevedores who manage terminals as profit centers, integrated carriers who manage terminals mainly as costs centers and a group of hybrid terminal operators consisting of shipping lines involved in the stevedoring business and handling both own cargo and third-party traffic to make profit. Combining the above insights transnational terminal operating companies are grouped in three categories:

Stevedores. Port terminal operators that expanded into new markets to replicate their expertise in terminal operations and to diversify their revenue geographically. Port of Singapore Authority (PSA) is the largest global terminal operator coming from a stevedore background.

Maritime shipping companies invested in port terminal facilities to help support their core maritime shipping business. In many cases hybrid structures are formed with separate business units or sister companies active in liner shipping or terminal operations. The terminal facilities can be operated on a single-user dedicated base or alternatively also be open to third shipping lines. APM Terminals, a sister company of Maersk Line, is
the largest global terminal operator coming from a maritime shipping background.

Financial holdings includes various financial interests ranging from investment banks, retirement funds to sovereign wealth funds attracted by the port terminal sector as an asset class and for revenue generation potential. The majority has an indirect management approach; acquiring an asset stake and leaving the existing operator take care of the operations. Others will manage directly the terminal assets through a parent company. Dubai Ports World (DPW), a branch of the Dubai World sovereign wealth fund, is the largest global terminal operator coming from a financial background.

Table 1 and Figure 1 provide an overview of the leading global terminal operators classified by volume and by hectares of terminals they control. As well as looking at total TEU handled by each global operator, Table 1 also provides global terminal operator throughput by the equity TEU measure, whereby throughput is adjusted to reflect the share of individual terminal operating companies held by the global operators. This indicator is the most relevant for analysis of profitability and entry strategy, beyond pure throughput. The top ten terminal operators control an increasing share of the world’s total container handlings: 64.6% in terms of total throughput handled in 2009 compared to 41.5% in 2001. The sample of terminal operators classified by Figure 1 accounts for 441 terminals worldwide totaling close to 23,000 hectares (230 square kilometers). Terminal control is allocated to the firm that has the largest equity stake. The results of Figure 1 should thus be treated with caution as various terminals have various levels of equity stakes and in many cases two major terminal operators have stakes in the same terminal. Terminals where terminal operators have a stevedoring contract are also included.
TABLE 1. THROUGHPUT OF THE TOP-10 GLOBAL CONTAINER TERMINAL OPERATORS FOR SELECTED YEARS

Throughput of the top 10 global container terminal operators (*)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>Share</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>Share</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>Share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HPH</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
<td>HPH</td>
<td>60.9</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
<td>HPH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSA</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
<td>APMT</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
<td>APMT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APMT</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>PSA</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
<td>PSA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P&amp;O Ports</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>DP World</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>DP World</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eurogate</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>Cosco Pacific</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>Cosco Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPA</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>Eurogate</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>MSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evergreen</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>Evergreen</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>Eurogate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cosco Pacific</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>SSA Marine</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>Evergreen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hanjin</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>MSC</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>SSA Marine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSA Marine</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>HHLA</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>CMA-CGM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Top 10</strong></td>
<td><strong>102.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>41.5%</strong></td>
<td><strong>Top 10</strong></td>
<td><strong>268.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>60.9%</strong></td>
<td><strong>Top 10</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Top 10 global container terminal operators’ equity based throughput

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>Share</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>Share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PSA</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
<td>PSA</td>
<td>45.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APMT</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>HPH</td>
<td>32.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HPH</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>DP World</td>
<td>31.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP World</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
<td>APMT</td>
<td>31.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evergreen</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>Cosco Pacific</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cosco Pacific</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>MSC</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eurogate</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>Evergreen</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHLA</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>SSA Marine</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OOCL</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>Eurogate</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APL</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>CMA-CGM</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Top 10</strong></td>
<td><strong>168.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>38.2%</strong></td>
<td><strong>Top 10</strong></td>
<td><strong>183.1</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Figures include all terminals in which 10% plus shareholdings were held. Figures do not include operations at common-user terminals


FIGURE 1. NUMBER OF Terminals AND TOTAL HECTARES CONTROLLED BY THE TWELVE LARGEST PORT HOLDINGS, 2010
Hong Kong based Hutchison Port Holdings (HPH), whilst remaining the overall market leader in total volume, number of terminals and hectares terms, holds the second place on an equity TEU basis, due to the sale of a 20% share in the company to Singapore-based PSA Corporation in 2006. APM Terminals, part of the Danish AP Moller group, takes second position in total TEU terms whilst DP World is in fourth place. Chinese Cosco Pacific has claimed fifth position in the equity TEU table. OOCL makes the top 10 in 2006 but having sold its Vancouver and New York terminals to Ontario Teachers’ Pension Fund (assets operated by Global Container Terminals), is no longer present in the top ten.

ENTRY AND EXPANSION STRATEGIES IN THE TERMINAL OPERATOR INDUSTRY

INTRODUCTION

The history and dynamics behind the internationalization strategies of global terminal operators have been widely addressed in academic literature. Peters [11] argues that international ventures were first established by terminal operators searching for investment opportunities...
abroad. Peters and later also De Souza et al. \cite{12} describe three consecutive waves in the internationalization of the container terminal industry. The first wave included companies HPH, P&O Ports and SSA who expanded their operations on a geographical scale thereby benefiting from the port privatization schemes in many regions across the world. As soon as the strategies of the pioneers proved to be successful, a second wave of companies started seeking expansion internationally (e.g. PSA, CSX World Terminals and Eurogate). A third wave of terminal operators emerged when major container carriers entered the terminal industry in an effort to support their core business. Olivier et al. \cite{9} contest the proposed chronology as the terminal entry of ocean carriers dates back to the container terminal investment decisions of steamship companies such as Sealand and American President Line (APL) in the 1960s and 1970s in a time when most port facilities were still state-controlled. While carrier investments in terminals are indeed not a recent phenomenon, it will be demonstrated that the scale of carrier involvement has reached more international heights in the last decade.

Expansion strategies of the three types of global terminal operators lean on horizontal or vertical integration processes \cite{13} or diversification strategies, depending on the type of operator (Table 2). The objectives and incentives of the three categories of global terminal operators differ. APM Terminals and Cosco Pacific are difficult to position. These companies were formed to become independent terminal operators from their sister carrier. From a firm-level standpoint they are stevedores since their core expertise is terminal operations. From a conglomerate standpoint, however, one could argue they are part of a group of companies that primarily serve ocean shipping interest and have as a major customer their sister carrier.

**Table 2. Types of Global Port Operators**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Stevedores</th>
<th>Maritime Shipping Companies</th>
<th>Financial Corporations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Business model</strong></td>
<td>Horizontal integration</td>
<td>Vertical integration</td>
<td>Portfolio diversification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Position of terminal operations w.r.t. core business</strong></td>
<td>Port operations is the core business; Investment in container terminals for expansion and diversification.</td>
<td>Maritime shipping is the main business; Investment in container terminals as a support function.</td>
<td>Financial assets management is the main business; Investment in container terminals for valuation and revenue generation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dominant expansion</strong></td>
<td>Expansion through</td>
<td>Expansion through direct</td>
<td>Expansion through</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
strategy | direct investment. | investment or through parent companies. | acquisitions, mergers and reorganization of assets.
---|---|---|---
Examples | PSA (Public), HHLA (Public), Eurogate (Private), HPH (Private), ICTSI (Private), SSA (Private). | APM (Private), COSCO (Public), MSC (Private), APL (Private), Hanjin (Private), Evergreen (Private). | DPW (Sovereign Wealth Fund), Ports America (AIG; Fund), RREEF (Deutsche Bank; Fund), Macquarie Infrastructure (Fund), Morgan Stanley Infrastructure (Fund), SSA Marine (Goldman Sachs). |

**Horizontal Integration**

The conventional actors that considered port operations as their core business, stevedores, have expanded into new locations. This involves mergers and acquisitions of existing terminals or the construction or expansion of new terminal facilities. Pursuing a strategy based on *organic growth* is generally the most obvious strategy available to container terminal operators.

When looking at the history of internationalization, the year 2001 stands out as the year of hostile take-overs with three landmark deals: HPH-ECT, PSA-HNN and HPH buying ICTSI’s International Business Division. The years 2005 to 2007 saw an extraordinary level of *merger and acquisition* activity in the terminal operator industry against a backdrop of increasing container terminal capacity shortages. A front-runner in the latest consolidation wave was DP World, through the acquisition of the terminal portfolios of CSX World Terminals (2005) and P&O Ports (2006). These two acquisitions have given DP World a significant presence on the container handling scene in China, Hong Kong, South (East) Asia, Australia, the Americas and Europe \(^{14}\). Apart from DP World’s acquisitions, another major deal was PSA’s acquisition of a 20% stake in Hutchison Port Holding’s global terminal portfolio, following its earlier purchase of strategic shareholdings in a number of other Hong Kong operations in 2005.

In addition, quite a number of terminal operators have taken shareholdings or increased their existing stakes in individual terminal businesses. Traditional stevedoring companies opted for horizontal integration in part to counterbalance the consolidation trend in liner shipping. Horizontal integration in liner shipping through strategic alliances and mergers and acquisitions has indeed enhanced consolidation at the demand side. The top 20 carriers controlled 26% of the world slot capacity in 1980, 42% in 1992 and more than 60% in 2008.
The traditional stevedores are thus confronted with larger and fewer shipping lines demanding better service at a lower cost \[15\]. Terminal operators face the constant risk of losing important clients, not because of deficiencies in port infrastructure or terminal operations, but because customers can reorganize their service networks or can engage in new partnerships with other carriers \[16\].

**Vertical Integration**

The horizontal integration process was concomitant with vertical integration strategies pursued by several maritime shipping companies that have invested in terminal operations. Coming from a new background and attracted by the growth prospects of the industry several financial holdings also became increasingly involved in terminal operations (or at least in the ownership part). The involvement of a shipping line in terminals can be grouped in four categories (see \[6\], \[17\]):

1. Special contractual berthing or volume agreements between a third-party stevedore and the shipping line (e.g. virtual dedication);
2. Minority shareholding of the shipping line in a terminal (typically below 20%);
3. Joint ventures between the shipping line and a third-party stevedore often linked to the dedicated use of the terminal by the shipping line;
4. A dedicated terminal with at least a 51% shareholding by the shipping line or its terminal operating sister. A more in-depth analysis on the issue of dedicated terminals is provided in \[18\], \[19\], \[19\] and \[20\].

By entering the terminal operator business, shipping lines or their parent companies gain control of terminal capacity deployment allowing them to better deal with problems of vessel schedule integrity \[21\] \[22\]. Hence, the operator will prioritize the handling of vessels in terms of berthing and crane density in view of an efficient synchronization of liner services (e.g. hub-feeder operations) and high schedule reliability. In particular MSC and CMA CGM, the world’s second and third largest container shipping lines, have been very active in this field, with in Europe alone involvements in 15 and 10 container terminals respectively. Other shipping lines with a strong presence in the terminal operator industry include Evergreen, COSCO (directly or via sister company Cosco Pacific), Hanjin, APL, NYK, K-Line, Yang Ming and Hyundai.

A number of liner terminals offer stevedoring services to third carriers as well, thereby creating some hybrid form between pure dedicated facilities
and independently operated multi-user facilities. For instance, Maersk Line’s parent company, AP Moller, operates a large number of container terminals through its subsidiary APM Terminals.

**Differentiation**

Parallel to horizontal and vertical integration, the terminal operation sector was penetrated by an array of large equity firms and financial corporations. Financial holdings’ prime objective is to generate a return on investment. Terminals are often seen as assets that generate economic rent and which are tradable through buying and selling operations (liquidity). Therefore, large equity firms, such as mutual, retirement and sovereign wealth funds, became interested in owning a stake in various terminal assets, notably port terminals, because of several value propositions:

*Intrinsic value.* As physical assets, terminals have an intrinsic value mostly related to real estate, infrastructure and equipment. Since terminals tend to occupy highly accessible locations that cannot be effectively substituted, this scarcity implies high valuations. Traffic growth linked with globalization made terminal assets even more valuable, so the intrinsic value of terminals is also directly related to the traffic they handle. The higher the traffic, the more valuable is the land that supports terminal operations. In such a context, it was expected that terminal assets would steadily increase in value.

*Operational value.* Terminals provide a source of income, linked with the rent they generate, which in turn is directly proportional to the traffic handled. This insures a constant revenue stream as freight traffic tends to have a limited, or at least an easily predictable seasonality. Future traffic growth expectations result in income growth expectations. Because of the potential for monopoly profit, financial institutions are particularly attracted to places where a local monopoly position is available.

*Risk mitigation value.* Transport terminals are quite standard in their infrastructure, equipment and operations implying that their business model can effectively be replicated in a variety of markets. This enables private equity firms to diversify their portfolios in different segments of the transportation industry (ports, airports, rail) while at the same time undertaking a geographical diversification. Terminal assets located in different regional markets help mitigate risks, particularly the risks related to traffic demand fluctuations and the pricing and capacity strategies of rivals and on alternative routes. A global portfolio might also help to reduce the financial and political risks associated of being active in only one market.
Privatization and Capital Costs as Drivers of Consolidation and Market Entry

The observed horizontal consolidation trend in the terminal operating industry as well as the entry of shipping lines and financial holdings has been instigated by a number of institutional, financial and operational considerations.

First of all, this trend is facilitated by the privatization of port activities through concession/lease agreements, BOT (Build Operate and Transfer) and other investment arrangements between port authorities or government bodies and private terminal operators. Landlord port authorities lease the land to private port operators on the basis of long-term concession agreements, in the range of 25 to 40 years. Port authorities have developed specific bidding procedures to grant concessions to the best possible candidates. The move towards transparent and open concession procedures resulted in local terminal operators no longer able to rely on shelter-based strategies for their survival. At the same time it facilitated through acquisition the local market entry of global players with deep pockets and specific know how.

Secondly, there is the increased proportion of fixed costs among total terminal operating costs, caused by ever higher initial capital expenditure on cranes, information technology and deepwater ports. The nature of the container handling business – notably its high fixed costs and lack of service differentiation (except in terms of location) – in theory creates significant opportunities to improve service through co-operation. However, forms of operational co-operation in the market do not come easily and most of the time they end up in mergers or acquisitions. An increasing number of financial institutions such as banks, hedge funds, private equity groups and investors entered the terminal business in the period between 2000 and 2007 (Babcock and Brown, Macquarie Infrastructure and American International Group to name a few), which resulted in higher valuations. Global terminal operators and investor groups have paid record prices for port assets (Table 3).

**Table 3. Major Port Terminal Acquisitions since 2005**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Transaction</th>
<th>Price paid for transaction compared to EBITDA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

11
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Multiples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>DP World takes over CSX World Terminals</td>
<td>14 times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early 2006</td>
<td>PSA acquires a 20% stake in HPH</td>
<td>17 times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid 2006</td>
<td>DP World acquires P&amp;O Ports</td>
<td>19 times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid 2006</td>
<td>Goldman Sachs Consortium acquires ABP</td>
<td>14.5 times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End 2006</td>
<td>AIG acquires P&amp;O Ports North America</td>
<td>24 times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early 2007</td>
<td>Ontario Teachers’ Pension Fund acquires OOIL Terminals</td>
<td>23.5 times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid 2007</td>
<td>RREEF acquires Maher Terminals</td>
<td>25 times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2007</td>
<td>Goldman Sachs acquires a majority share in Carrix, the parent company of SSA Marine</td>
<td>Not disclosed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: EBITDA = Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization  
Source: Compiled from the acquiring firms’ press releases.

**LIMITS TO CONSOLIDATION**

Evidence underlines that the consolidation process that has rapidly taken place in recent years may have reached limits. From one side, most of the global terminal assets are already part of the portfolio of global terminal operators and from the other diminishing returns are likely to play in view of growing competition and questionable future growth opportunities. Given the fact that there are no large companies or terminal assets left to acquire nowadays, it can be expected that the top four players (PSA, APM Terminals, HPH and DP World) will maintain their lead over the other operators for quite a number of years to come. Further consolidation may also be restricted by institutional factors, particularly the policies of national and supranational competition authorities who closely monitor the risks of having dominant actors in regional container markets.

However, there are a number of highly active smaller players in the market, building international portfolios. These include Shanghai International Port Group (SIPG), Macquarie, ICTSI, KGL and RREEF. China Merchants Holdings recently launched its internationalization through deals in Vietnam (May 2010) and Sri Lanka (Sept 2010). It is a sizeable player with 43.9 million TEU in 2009.

**THE SPATIAL EXPANSION OF TERMINAL OPERATORS**
Building competitive advantage

The spatial dimension of terminal business has been remarkable, more in particular the expansion of terminal portfolio activities on an ever larger geographical scale, from local to regional and global. Port terminal operations have similarities with retailing as both are market servicing activities where accessibility is fundamental. While for retailing a market area represents a customer base, a hinterland is what defines a similar relationship for a seaport terminal. Each terminal facility is mostly independent from the others with competition taking place over the fundamental issues of price, reliability and quality of service. Each terminal operator possesses a range of physical and intangible assets and capabilities.

The objective is to get access to a port and secure a customer base, which in many ports around the world requires a concession agreement with the local port authority where a port operator negotiates the terms of a long-term leasing agreement [23][25]. In some locations this can lead to a spatial monopoly power. An alternative strategy consists in entering a port via the merger with or acquisition of an incumbent firm. Terminal operators wishing to operate in a foreign port services market would have to possess some competencies that would offset the advantages held by incumbent firms. These are to be found in the area of firm size and the realization of economies of scale and scope, market power and marketing skills, technological expertise or access to cheaper sources of finance. Musso et al. [18] identify the ability of firms to broaden their scale and scope through horizontal expansion as the most important driver of the internationalization of terminal operators.

The competitiveness of a terminal operator is related to the array of resources for its business and strategy [26]. The management’s ability to consolidate the company’s capabilities and skills into competencies that empowers the operating company to adapt quickly to changing opportunities is the real source of competitive advantage [27]. It can be argued that a global terminal operator’s core competence should (a) provide potential access to a wide variety of port service markets (b) make a significant contribution to terminal users’ benefits and (c) be difficult for competing ports to imitate. If a core competence is based on a complexity of technologies and skills it will be difficult for competing terminal operators to imitate and it will therefore have a higher probability of generating a competitive advantage. For example, the fully automated container terminals operated by ECT of the HPH group in the port of Rotterdam is the result of a technological process that is difficult to imitate but the technology itself can rather easily be transferred to
other ports. A competitive advantage purely based on technological competencies is less durable. As equipment is getting increasingly standardized (e.g. Shanghai-based ZPMC, the world’s largest gantry crane producer, supplies around 60% of the world’s demand for quay cranes) and can be replicated, competitiveness is more than often a matter of operational efficiency, quality of hinterland access and process innovation. Olivier et al. \[9\] have argued that IT and managerial know-how are increasingly differentiating and defining the competitive advantage of global terminal operators. IT (software as opposed to hardware) has been the source of much of the strategic partnerships and alliances the operators have engaged to leverage international opportunities.

Global terminal operators, particularly stevedores and financial holdings, run terminals as profit centers. Greater efficiency is gained and cost savings are realized by implementing common systems across the terminal network. Global terminal operators often have central purchasing departments at their headquarters involved in making large contracts with the suppliers of terminal equipment such as gantry cranes or terminal tractors. The pooling of orders for various terminals reduces the unit purchasing price of cranes and yard equipment. Similar arrangements are made for the purchase and maintenance of terminal planning software, which in some cases is developed in-house (e.g. the terminal and ship planning software house Cosmos has recently been integrated in the PSA group). The output of research and development units stationed at various locations across the world is typically shared among the terminals of the whole network through knowledge sharing configurations based on IT-platforms and intensive workshops. Also, the creation of extensive networks makes it possible to spread investment risks.

**FROM SINGLE LOCATIONS TO A GLOBAL NETWORK**

It is only through growth strategies that global operators have progressed from being single location / regional players into the global market. The organizational forms adopted by terminal operators to internationalize their business and create partnerships with other firms are strongly entwined with local institutional setting. Olivier \[7\] refers in this context to the role of ‘place-specificity’ and ‘territorial embeddedness’ linked to the home market in understanding expansion strategies. In line with the ‘home market factor’ \[9\], the home ports typically remain very important in the network of these operators as illustrated in Table 4.
TABLE 4. THE ROLE OF HOME PORTS IN THE TOTAL WORLDWIDE CONTAINER THROUGHPUT OF A SELECTION OF GLOBAL TERMINAL OPERATORS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Home port</th>
<th>2002 '000 TEU share</th>
<th>2007 '000 TEU share</th>
<th>2009 '000 TEU share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHLA</td>
<td>Hamburg</td>
<td>3494 87.5%</td>
<td>6698 91.4%</td>
<td>4700 94.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP World</td>
<td>Dubai</td>
<td>4194 79.2%</td>
<td>10663 24.6%</td>
<td>10970 24.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICTSI</td>
<td>Manilla</td>
<td>1043 80.3%</td>
<td>1372 43.1%</td>
<td>1396 38.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSA</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>16800 64.0%</td>
<td>27100 47.5%</td>
<td>25140 44.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eurogate</td>
<td>Bremerhaven</td>
<td>2984 31.3%</td>
<td>4875 35.1%</td>
<td>4536 36.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HPH</td>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>10459 28.5%</td>
<td>12322 18.6%</td>
<td>11206 17.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSA Marine</td>
<td>Seattle</td>
<td>711 16.0%</td>
<td>1070 13.8%</td>
<td>705 7.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In developing a global expansion strategy, HPH, PSA, APM Terminals and DP World try to sustain competitive advantage by building barriers to prevent competitors entering their domains or against them succeeding if they do. These barriers are partly based on the building of strongholds in selected ports around the world and on advanced know how on the construction and management of container terminals. When discussing the US airline industry, Goetz and Sutton[^28] used the term ‘fortress hubs’ to indicate strongholds where, apart from the dominant carrier, no other carrier has been able to establish their operations. Terminal growth involves replicating a similar business model and providing capital for infrastructure improvements. The scale of operations has created substantial surplus capital that allow them to withstand an intensive competitive war and that enable them to financially outperform rival companies in case of bidding procedures for new terminal operations. The surplus capital is used to move resources wherever they are necessary either to preserve their own interests or tackle competition. Fixed costs in the container handling business are comparatively high relative to operating costs, and economies of scale are fairly high. Global players seem to be best placed to meet the high capital requirements to cover initial investments in a terminal of a reasonable scale.

For example, PSA first built a stronghold at its home base Singapore before taking the step towards global scale and coverage. The critical mass and its focused strategy at Singapore enabled PSA to develop
exceptional competencies in terminal handling as additional real estate for port development is extremely difficult to come by within the city-state. Once the company established itself as an international benchmark, the company’s ambitions went global through a mixed strategy of organic growth (new terminals) and acquisitions (e.g. HesseNoordNatie in 2001) backed up by a sound financial status. This development was accelerated by increased competition at its Singapore terminals, not at the least from newcomer Tanjung Pelepas in Malaysia (APM, 1999), and with it less opportunities for internal growth.

Not all operators started their international expansion from the respective home markets. Olivier et al. [9] uses the case of Hanjin to demonstrate that institutional impediments for investments in the home market can make operators decide to start the international expansion of their terminal network out of foreign ports.

REGIONAL DIFFERENCES
The differences across regions in terms of the internationalization of container terminal operations has been discussed extensively in academic literature [29] [11] [10] [7] [5] [30]. A number of factors have been identified that enhance or restrict regional expansion in different markets.

First of all, there are the supply and demand characteristics of the regional market. Global investors base their investment strategy on exhaustive analyses of profitability, operational efficiency, growth potential and the level of indigenous cargo. Port regions with poor prospects in terms of throughput growth gain less interest from potential investors, certainly when inter-port or intra-port competition is high. Transshipment terminals present a riskier investment (higher vulnerability) since the volumes are more footloose and much more subject to pricing strategies of rival transshipment hubs than in the case of gateway cargo [31]. Regions with a high concentration in port volumes in a few ports or with terminal capacity constraints are much more prone to the direct involvement of shipping lines as these actors are urged to secure capacity. Slack and Frémont [10] identified this factor as a major reason for the early adoption of dedicated terminals in the US. The ability to take firm control of the supply chain is also a key issue as it leads to a functional integration between transportation and distribution. Shipping lines might be more eager to enter a regional terminal market if the chances of successfully extending their value creation toward the hinterland and the entire supply chain are higher. A ‘closed’ regional cargo market controlled by local interests (e.g. incumbent logistics players or forwarding agents) which seek to maximize rent extraction on cargo passing through the region, can deter potential terminal investors.
The second factor relates to the *degree of private operator participation in the regional container market*. Not all regions around the world show the same timeline in opening up local container markets to private operators. For example, South America and Eastern Europe have started to walk the path of port privatization one or more decades later than many port regions in Europe and North America. Even within the same region large differences might exist at the level of port governance and institutional arrangements. For instance, Slack and Frémont \(^{10}\) demonstrate that the late arrival of international terminal operators in France was the combined result of the peculiar status of container crane drivers in French ports (prior to the recent port reform), the captive nature of much of the French cargo and the shelter strategies of local terminal operators. Olivier et al. \(^9\) rightly state that the supply of investment opportunities is not endless and is constrained by institutional factors facing the investors to enter in foreign markets.

Differences in local institutional factors and the degree of openness of the local terminal market might imply that the advance of global terminals operators is very visible in one market and is lagging behind in another. This also implies that part of the observed internationalization in the terminal industry cannot be explained by the deliberate strategies of the actors involved, but are simply a result of terminal operators seizing new, sometimes unexpected, opportunities to enter a local market. Jacobs and Notteboom \(^{32}\) argue that the outcome of investment strategies of terminal operators are in large part confined by the ‘locational windows of opportunity’ in specific ports or regions and the ‘critical junctures’ in concessioning procedures; only the terminal operator who is granted the terminal can enter. This can lead to a ‘jewel in the crown’ phenomenon where an operator is willing to purchase an entire portfolio and bear extra risk to acquire a particular facility. For example, HPH bought ICTSI’s facilities in 2001 as it considered its Mexican operations (Ensenada in particular) as a mean to tap into North American markets.

A third factor that might lead to regional differences in the internationalization of port terminal operations is the *potential increase in the valuation of the terminal asset*. This factor is strongly related to the demand and supply profile in the region as terminal assets are typically valued higher when located in markets with a high growth potential and high terminal capacity utilization.

Global terminal operators are increasingly hedging the risks by setting up dedicated terminal joint ventures in cooperation with shipping lines. Another way of enhanced cooperation in the container terminal industry consist of offering long term contracts to shipping lines with gain sharing.
clauses as it was the case for PNCT (AIG) and MSC in the Port of New York. Soppé et al. [17] discuss the increased cooperation between terminal operators and shipping lines in setting up terminals. While the empirical evidence in the paper points to more cooperation, there are no real global partnerships between carriers and terminal operators, mainly because the largest carriers prefer taking advantage of diversification of their suppliers’ portfolio at the global level rather than a close cooperation with a limited number of major pure terminal operators.

The above developments have led to a growing complexity and regional differences in terminal ownership structures and partnership arrangements. Figures 2 to 4 provide an illustration for selected container ports in Belgium and the Netherlands (Rotterdam, Antwerp and Zeebrugge), North America (New York and Los Angeles / Long Beach) and the Pearl River Delta (Hong Kong, Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Guangzhou). Interesting patterns are emerging:

The US West Coast has quite an extensive penetration of shipping line terminal operators, mostly Japanese and Korean. This represents the first wave of Asian export-oriented strategies with Japanese and Korean interests able to secure terminal assets in the 1980s and 1990s when there was still the possibility to do so. In spite of their importance, Chinese carriers are less represented as there were few assets left to be acquired or developed with the export-oriented strategy of China came in full force in the late 1990s.

The Rhine-Scheldt Delta has witnessed an influx of global terminal operators since the mid-1990s. In the last five years or so, this development has been complemented by more complex shareholding structures also involving shipping lines and strategic alliances among them. The complexity and interrelations between the three container ports is expected to increase even further in the near future, exemplified by the Maasvlakte 2 development in Rotterdam.

PSA and Hong Kong-based HPH and Modern Terminals started to extend their presence in the Pearl River Delta by including terminals in mainland China, particularly in Shenzhen and Guangzhou, thereby lowering Hong Kong’s dominance in the region. This penetration in mainland China follows the joint-venture model so common in the setting of manufacturing facilities where a global corporation enters into an agreement with a local Chinese firm (or government branch), commonly specifically created for the purpose. Otherwise, the asset could not have been readily secured due to the regulatory environment.
Notes:

(1) Through subsidiary company ZIM Ports; (2) Through subsidiary company Terminal Link; (3) Duisport is the fifth shareholder with a share of 7.5%; (4) Unconfirmed reports put NYK’s ECT interest at 10%.

The CKYH Alliance includes the shipping lines Cosco, K-Line, Hanjin and Yang Ming. NYK is part of the Grand Alliance that includes the shipping lines Hapag-Lloyd, NYK and OOCL. The Malaysian shipping company MISC was a member of the Grand Alliance till early 2009. The New World Alliance includes the shipping lines APL, MOL and Hyundai Merchant Marine.

Source: own elaboration based on company information.
Figure 3: Inter-firm relationships in selected container ports of North America – situation in mid 2010

Source: own elaboration based on company information
**Figure 4: Inter-firm relationships in selected container ports of the Pearl River Delta – situation in mid 2010**

Note: Dongguan has been amalgamated to Guangzhou for simplicity.

Source: own elaboration based on company information

**How ‘Global’ are the Global Terminal Operators?**

**Geographic Coverage**

Assessing the transnational nature of terminal operators can be done over several dimensions. The first is an overview of the *geographic coverage* of a sample of major global operators in terms of how much terminal real estate is controlled and where. As critical elements of the maritime / land interface container port terminals link the regional activities of production and consumption to global markets. Ownership in whole or in part is an important mean of access to regional freight distribution. Figure 5 underlines that the assets controlled by global terminal operators are servicing every single market of significance, with a particular concentration among the world’s major commercial gateways. The majority of terminals also clearly correspond to the underlying structure of global shipping networks. Therefore, the
geographical coverage of global terminal operators is a near perfect representation of global long distance trade.

The spatial concentration of global terminal networks is also very evident when looking at the regional scale, although systems used might differ regionally based on factors embedded in institutional and governance aspects that are regionally bound. Slack and Frémon [10] demonstrated that the non-carrier based global terminal operators have only moderately penetrated the North American stevedoring market, while at the same time they have expanded business considerably in Asia and Europe. A lack of liberalization in the port sector, dock labor problems and a strong preference towards liner-operated terminals to secure port cargo (port concern) and space (carrier concern) are the main reasons for the specific North American situation.

In Europe, the top five leading operators (HPH, PSA, APM Terminals, Eurogate and DP World) handled an estimated 75% of the total European container throughput in 2008 compared to less than 50% in 1998, illustrating the mature and consolidated nature of this market. The consolidation trend in European container handling leads to some controversy [15]. The industry structure has become sufficiently concentrated to raise a fundamental question about whether market forces are sufficient to prevent the abuse of market power.

**FIGURE 5. CONTAINER TERMINAL SURFACE PER PORT OF A SAMPLE OF PORT HOLDINGS**
**REGIONAL ORIENTATION**

A second way to look at the transnational nature of container terminal operators is to assess the *regional orientation* of each holding. As a whole, global terminal operators could appear a truly global industry (as seen on Figure 5), but it is important to see if this also holds true within the geographical distribution of terminal assets by holding company. If this is not the case, then we are dealing with a regionally-focused industry that supports global trade. The size of the terminal holding company is in clear relationship with the multi-regional character of its terminal assets (Figures 6 and 7), an observation that is common for multinational corporations. Therefore, there is a range in the geographical orientation of terminal assets, from regional to global.

**FIGURE 6. CONTAINER TERMINAL PORTFOLIO OF THE FOUR MAIN GLOBAL TERMINAL OPERATORS**
Figure 6 reveals a substantial geographical diversity of terminal assets for the four major holdings. DP World and APM Terminals have the most
diversified portfolio of terminals in terms of geographical spread and can thus be considered the most “global” of the global terminal operators. The four main operators are well represented in the Pearl River Delta (about 52 million TEU throughput in 2009), the Malacca Strait ports (39 million TEU) and the Rhine-Scheldt Delta (20 million TEU). However, other major port regions in North America and East Asia are dominated by other terminal operator groups, mainly shipping lines or partnerships between shipping lines and local terminal operators. This is particularly visible in the San Pedro Bay where Japanese and Korean shipping lines (APL, NYK, MOL, Evergreen, Yang Ming, K-Line, HMM, Hanjin) have been able to secure terminal assets in the 1980s and 1990s when there was still the possibility to do so. However, a level of regional orientation is already evident at this level. APM Terminals does not have a presence in Australia, while DP World has only a very small presence in North America (CenTerm in Vancouver). PSA has no direct presence in North America, but has Latin American assets, as well as HPH.

Combining figure 1 and figure 6 provides further insight. Both HPH and PSA seem to prefer the control of large terminal facilities since terminal operations is the core of their activities. They were actively involved in the development of large export-oriented port facilities in Pacific Asia. APM Terminals tends to have comparatively smaller terminals, underlining a strategy leaning more on global market coverage to support its sister shipping company Maersk Line. DP World has also a small hectare portfolio comparatively to its sizable number of terminals in which it has the largest equity (50). This underlines an aggressive growth strategy aimed at acquiring existing terminal assets, many of which in lower volume markets having a strong growth potential (e.g. the Mediterranean, South Asia and the Middle East). The first step for DP World is thus to acquire existing terminals and then undertake modernization projects to make the port terminal more productive. Many of the DP World investments are found in secondary port regions, as most of the ports in these regions have undergone extensive privatization or corporatization processes in the last two decades. The governments in these countries are often prone to grant access to global terminal operators with the goal of significantly increasing port productivity.

The strong global character of the largest operators is a bit in contrast with the regional orientation of smaller holding companies (Figure 7). Two in particular, Ports America and Eurogate, are strictly regional operators. Others are embarking into a substantial transnational strategy, mostly by securing concessions at smaller terminals. The above observations are confirmed when the regional share in terms of terminal
hectares is tabulated for each of the port holdings in the sample (Figure 8).

**Figure 8. Regional share in the total terminal portfolio of the twelve largest global terminal operators (hectares, 2010)**

Source: own elaboration based on companies’ websites and specialized press

PSA, HPH and Cosco Pacific are among the leading terminal operators with a very strong Asian presence. In contrast to PSA and HPH, Cosco Pacific has limited its European interests to the Mediterranean. Ports America is only present in North America. This is understandable given that the company, owned by American International Group / Highstar Capital, purchased the American assets of DP World in late 2006 after a political debate on the ‘dangers’ of having Dubai interests controlling the former P&O Ports terminals in the US. SSA Marine relies strongly on its American terminal network (both North and South). Eurogate, founded by German company Eurokai and Contship Italia, is a pure European player with most of its terminals in Germany and Italy.

**Equity Sharing Agreements and Finance**

Various and complex *equity sharing agreements* representing different stakes in regional markets are a third dimension in the globalism of terminal operators as they are linked with expansion strategies to
reinforce a presence in existing markets or to expand into new ones. Figures 2 to 4 illustrated that these complex arrangements lead to highly complex market structures at a regional level. Even the largest operators commonly have regional stakes in others’ assets, such as PSA’s 20% stake in HPH. The common pattern is however a global terminal operator acquiring a stake in a local or regional operator, beginning the process of integrating the terminals into the existing network. This enables to keep existing local expertise and customers while mitigating foreign control concerns. Such transactions are commonly implying terminal expansion projects so that the terminal asset can increase its revenue generation through performance improvements. When entering a local market, global terminal operators can also opt for maximum control through acquisition. Last, but not least, the relationships between the terminal operation industry with global financial institutions also reveal a sector with a strong global emphasis that has been particularly successful in recent years at securing financing for capital investments. Terminal operators are as much perceived from an asset management perspective (ROI) as they are from a functional perspective (terminal operation). Global finance and global container terminal operations are thus intractably linked with interdependent leverage; the port holding uses finance to leverage its capital investment opportunities while financial institutions are using port holdings to leverage their rate of return as well as the book value of their assets.

THE IMPACT OF THE ECONOMIC CRISIS ON CORPORATE GEOGRAPHY

Up to recently, a pervasive response to these challenges by all stakeholders has been the diversification of their assets both geographically as well as in terms of their involvement in supply chains. Yet, the financial and economic crisis of 2008-2009 seems to have imposed a reassessment of this strategy. In spite of expected future growth, global terminal operators are involved for the first time in a range of rationalization strategies. In this section we will discuss these strategies in greater detail.

INTENSIFIED COST CONTROL

The year 2008 was a turning point for the terminal operator industry as the final quarter saw unprecedented volume declines due to an emerging world economic and financial crisis. The contraction in global container port throughput in 2009 amounted to approximately 15%. Operating margins in container liner shipping industry reached -16% in 2009 but recovered to +7% in 2010 (figures Alphaliner). In the recent
financial/economic crisis terminal operators have done better than shipping lines. Table 5 illustrates that the EBITDA of major global container terminal operators was hardly affected by the economic crisis. While many shipping lines faced losses in 2009, a vast majority of terminal operators succeeded in remaining profitable.

**Table 5: EBITDA Margin for a Selection of Global Container Terminal Operators**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HPH</td>
<td>60.6%</td>
<td>60.3%</td>
<td>58.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSA</td>
<td>29.8%</td>
<td>28.9%</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APMT</td>
<td>18.4%</td>
<td>24.4%</td>
<td>25.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPW</td>
<td>40.8%</td>
<td>38.0%</td>
<td>40.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eurogate</td>
<td>28.3%</td>
<td>25.3%</td>
<td>26.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: company websites (2010 figures) and Drewry (2008 and 2009 figures)

One of the key reasons behind the good financial results of the global terminal operator industry despite the economic crisis is related to severe cost-control measures, including a revision of investment plans, equipment maintenance schedules and asset deployment strategies. The focus on cost control is clearly reflected in the press statements of the major operators:

“The APM Terminals Global Terminal Network has not been immune from the negative effects of the 15% decline in global container throughput in 2009 as compared with 2008, with the company’s container handling dropping by 9%, and terminal development projects reviewed, postponed, and in some cases, cancelled. The company remains profitable; however, due mainly to the cost saving measures taken to meet the crisis as it emerged in 2008.” (APM Terminals press release, 18 November 2009).

“PSA management, staff and the unions met the challenge by responding quickly and pulling together to put in place cost-control measures while still providing world class quality service to our customers. This unity in mind and action has helped to shore up our bottom line.” (PSA press release, 3 April 2010).

“We have continued our focus on cash generation and cost management as well as driving efficiencies in our terminals.” (DP World press release, 23 March 2011).
“The EUROGATE Group has posted a significantly higher operating result for fiscal 2010 compared to the previous year [...]. Thanks to an extensive cost-savings and flexibilisation programme and significantly reduced investments, the Group has managed to overcome the difficult conditions that prevailed in the previous year and adapt quickly to changes in the market situation.” (Eurogate press release, 20 April 2011)

The crisis has changed the way terminal operators think about equipment maintenance as it revealed to be a key area for realizing cost savings. Terminal operators opted for a reduction in equipment maintenance spent during the recession which could affect safety and will increase life cycle costs if the strategy is maintained long term. Most global terminal operators keep most equipment maintenance in house. Outside contractors are facing more pressure for cost reductions in parts and spares. Companies that save on maintenance costs might not suffer a short-term productivity reduction, but might face a decline in the medium or the long term when the effects of a chronic lack of maintenance come to the fore.

Another way of cost reduction relates to concession agreements. Renegotiation of existing concession agreements has become a more common practice as terminal operators seek to renegotiate terms with a port authority in view of traffic expectations failing to materialize. This particularly concerns minimum traffic clauses where a global terminal operator pays a penalty if the terminal fails to handle a specific annual volume. The latest concession agreements try to anticipate to future tensions in this field by including variable throughput guarantees (i.e. the imposed volume guarantees are adjustable subject to a number of factors) or by replacing fixed throughput guarantees with minimum investment levels.

**REVIEW, POSTPONEMENT AND CANCELLATION OF TERMINAL PROJECTS**

Terminal operators are now more open to consider cancellation or postponement of terminal acquisition or construction projects which tend to be the most capital intensive and risky decisions. This is the most straightforward strategy as a global terminal operator stops its geographical expansion and portfolio diversification strategy to reassess regional growth potential. While there is a lack of transparency about global operator plans as it remains a highly competitive business, press releases make clear that quite a number of capacity expansion projects
were being shelved, deferred or cancelled as a result of the economic crisis.

For instance, the Philadelphia Regional Port Authority postponed in 2009 the bidding process for the design and construction of a new container terminal in the former Philadelphia Navy Yard. Shanghai International Port Group (SIPG) decided to postpone the taking of a minority shareholding in the APM Terminals facility in the port of Zeebrugge in Belgium. The economic crisis has also served to delay the second phase expansion of Tanger Med (the proposed TC3 and TC4 terminals) in Morocco. TC3 was planned to be used by Maersk and operated by its sister company APM Terminals, but the group decided to keep it under review. The plan for TC4 is still on track albeit with a time line pushed back from initiation in 2012 to 2014 and with some structural changes in terms of management (i.e. PSA International has withdrawn from the project). The London Gateway deep-sea port and logistics park on the banks of the Thames, which was originally due to open in 2010, is now set for completion in 2014. The construction of the new Jade Weser Port in Wilhelmshaven is proceeding according to a revised plan with a delayed opening date in August 2012. Rotterdam World Gateway, a 4 million TEU terminal now under way at Maasvlakte 2 and also led by DP World, incurred a small delay of 6 months for a 2014 expected completion. In view of minimizing risks, a growing number of large terminal projects are set to open in phases according to revised market demands.

**More selective investment decisions**

Global terminal operators are showing a more careful and selective approach when bidding for new terminal concessions or acquiring terminal assets. Terminal operators more than ever pay attention to the careful selection of good locations. Terminal investments are subject to a thorough risk assessment taking into account the characteristics in the regional market (capacity situation, market growth, etc...), tariff uncertainty, fee structure, licenses and permits and nautical and inland accessibility. Commercial banks remain cautious and have become more demanding on terms and project characteristics. Only very good projects will raise the needed funds.

Global terminal operators particularly look at the emerging markets for further investment in new terminals. These high growth markets are found in Asia, Latin America, Africa, India, Eastern Europe and the Middle East. The recent terminal investments by APM Terminals and DP World provide a good illustration of the focus on emerging markets (Figures 9 and 10).
**FIGURE 9. CHANGES IN THE TERMINAL PORTFOLIO OF APM TERMINALS BETWEEN APRIL 2008 AND APRIL 2011**

*April 2011:* Acquisition of an 80% share in Poti Sea Port (Georgia - Black Sea) from Ras Al Khaimah Investment Authority (RAKIA).
*April 2011:* Selected to run “Terminal Muelle Norte” in the port of Callao (at full capacity 2.9 million TEU).
*March 2011:* 33 year concession for the design, financing, construction, operation and maintenance of the new Moin Container Terminal (TCM) in Costa Rica.

*Oct 2010:* Idea launched to construct a new container terminal at the Port of Monfalcone in the North Adriatic.
*Aug 2010:* Acquisition of 50% of the shares in Brasil Terminal Portuario (BTP), a container terminal being built in Santos. Partner is Terminal Investment Limited.
*July 2010:* Terminal Link, CMA CGM’s subsidiary dedicated to container terminal investment, increased its shares in Nord France Terminals International o.u. (NFTI) from 30% to 91% through the acquisition of APM Terminals 61% share. The other 9% remain owned by the Port Authority of Dunkirk.
*July 2010:* Increase of share in Mobile Container Terminal LLC (MCT) from 80% to 100% through the acquisition of Terminal Link’s 20% share.
*June 2010:* APM Terminals and the Virginia Port Authority enter into an agreement that will lease APM Terminals’ Virginia facility to VPA for a term of 20 years. APM Terminals will continue to own the facility and its principal capital assets.
*May 2010:* APM Terminals and Shanghai International Port Group (SIPG) finalized an agreement for SIPG to acquire a 25% share of APM Terminals Zeebrugge for EUR 27.16 million.
*May 2010:* Hanjin Pacific takes over APM Terminals facilities at Piers 76 and 77 in Kaohsiung, Taiwan.

*Dec 2009:* Announcement of extension of Aqaba Container Terminal (ACT) which will increase annual container throughout capacity to 2 million TEU.
*May 2009:* APM Terminals partner in Bollore Africa Logistics consortium to develop a container terminal at Port of Pointe-Noire in Congo (27-year concession).
*February 2009:* APM Terminals (Jamaica) concludes operations management contract with the Kingston Container Terminal (KCT). KCT is owned by the Port Authority of Jamaica and has been managed by APM Terminals since 2001. Management is transferred back to the port authority.

*June 2008:* Opening of APM Terminals Apapa, Lagos, Nigeria
*April 2008:* APM Terminals has agreed to sell its 20% share in Qasim International Container Terminal Pakistan Limited (QICT), located in Karachi, Pakistan to DP World. DP World is currently the operator and majority shareholder of the facility.
*April 2008:* APM Terminals assumes management and operational control of the container facility at the Port of Pecém in Northeastern Brazil.
*April 2008:* Vancouver Fraser Port Authority has selected a joint venture between APM Terminals North America and SNC-Lavalin as the preferred proponent for the Terminal 2 Project.

**FIGURE 10. CHANGES IN THE TERMINAL PORTFOLIO OF DP WORLD BETWEEN APRIL 2008 AND APRIL 2011**

• April 2011: Acquisition of an 80% share in Poti Sea Port (Georgia - Black Sea) from Ras Al Khaimah Investment Authority (RAKIA).
• April 2011: Selected to run “Terminal Muelle Norte” in the port of Callao (full capacity 2.9 million TEU).
• March 2011: 33 year concession for the design, financing, construction, operation and maintenance of the new Moin Container Terminal (TCM) in Costa Rica.

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• July 2010: Increase of share in Mobile Container Terminal LLC (MCT) from 80% to 100% through the acquisition of Terminal Link’s 20% share.
• June 2010: APM Terminals and the Virginia Port Authority enter into an agreement that will lease APM Terminals’ Virginia facility to VPA for a term of 20 years. APM Terminals will continue to own the facility and its principal capital assets.
• May 2010: APM Terminals and Shanghai International Port Group (SIPG) finalized an agreement for SIPG to acquire a 25% share of APM Terminals Zeebrugge for EUR 27.16 million.
• May 2010: Hanjin Pacific takes over APM Terminals facilities at Piers 76 and 77 in Kaohsiung, Taiwan.

• December 2009: Announcement of extension of Aqaba Container Terminal (ACT) which will increase annual container throughout capacity to 2 million TEU.
• May 2009: APM Terminals partner in Bollore Africa Logistics consortium to develop a container terminal at Port of Pointe-Noire in Congo (27-year concession).
• February 2009: APM Terminals (Jamaica) concludes operations management contract with the Kingston Container Terminal (KCT). KCT is owned by the Port Authority of Jamaica and has been managed by APM Terminals since 2001. Management is transferred back to the port authority.

• June 2008: Opening of APM Terminals Apapa, Lagos, Nigeria
• April 2008: APM Terminals has agreed to sell its 20% share in Qasim International Container Terminal Pakistan Limited (QICT), located in Karachi, Pakistan to DP World. DP World is currently the operator and majority shareholder of the facility.
• April 2008: APM Terminals assumes management and operational control of the container facility at the Port of Pecém in Northeastern Brazil.
• April 2008: Vancouver Fraser Port Authority has selected a joint venture between APM Terminals North America and SNC-Lavalin as the preferred proponent for the Terminal 2 Project.

Source: own compilation based on press releases
In terms of container throughput, two thirds of the global container throughput is handled in ports in emerging markets. Areas such as South America, sub-Saharan Africa and the Indian sub-continent have been traditionally underserved by the modern container shipping industry, but are also among the economically emerging parts of the world where both economic and population growth are projected to significantly increase demands on transportation infrastructure, particularly modern port facilities and container handling capability in the decades ahead.

Of key interest in any M&A activity will be the valuation of port and terminal assets. In the peak period of demand growth and interest in acquiring terminals during 2005-2007, port companies were being valued (and paid for) at EBITDA multiples in excess of 20 times (see Table 2 earlier in this paper). With the crash in demand and the credit crunch, this exceptional situation has ended, at least for the time being. Anecdotal evidence suggests that multiples of around 8-12 times EBITDA are the new benchmark, but there has yet to be any major M&A deal going through to verify these new levels in the market.
Complex ownership and partnership structures to hedge risks

As demonstrated in Figures 2 to 4, we observe a growing complexity and regional differences in terminal ownership structures and partnership arrangements. At the same time, there is growing tension between the flexibility shipping lines want in sourcing their terminal requirements and the need of terminal operators to protect their investments in terminal facilities. Hence, shipping lines are generally unwilling to offer exclusivity while terminal operators might aim for exclusivity or at least a minimum volume commitment in order for the shipping line to benefit from certain preferential rates, terms and conditions, berth access or agreed levels of productivity and other performance indicators.

Divestment in terminals

An increasing number of terminal operators are selling stakes in terminal assets for financial relief, but where the terminal operator keeps its role as an operator. This commonly involves a financial holding seeking an opportunity to acquire terminal assets while leaving the existing terminal operator manages the terminal. For instance, Citi Infrastructure acquired in 2010 a 75% stake in DPW’s Australian portfolio composed of 5 container terminals (see also Figure 10).

The terminal market is also witnessing increased consolidation of a regional terminal portfolio where a global terminal operator may divest from a terminal to consolidate its activities in others. This leads to the opportunity to rationalize a cluster of port terminals. As shown in Figure 9, APM Terminals Virginia was leased to Virginia International Terminals (VIT), which is the terminal operating branch of the Virginia Port Authority. The agreement will lead to a rationalization of the terminal facilities with the transfer of container activities from the Portsmouth Terminal to the two major facilities managed by VIT; Norfolk International Terminals and the newly acquired APM Terminals Virginia.

Equity swaps are used, particularly in the case of shipping companies, to rebalance their portfolio to better reflect their shipping network configuration. Instead of divestiture, two terminal operators swap equity within their respective portfolios without the need to provide capital. In July 2010 APM Terminals and CMA-CGM agreed to an equity swap concerning their respective terminals in North America and Europe. In exchange for its 20% stake at the Mobile Container Terminal, CMA-CGM got APM’s 61% stake at Nord France Terminal International, totaling a total of 91% ownership when adding to its existing 30% stake. With this
20% stake APM took full control of the Mobile terminal since it was already controlling an 80% stake.

Outright divesture also takes place where a holding or terminal operator is forced to relinquish parts or the whole of its assets, mostly because of bankruptcy. Assets are therefore sold to other holdings or operators, particularly those judged to be profitable. For instance in 2009 the financial holding Babcock and Brown was placed into receivership. Part of its portfolio included container terminal assets, some of which that were acquired by Euroports. Other examples include the divestments of APM Terminals in Kingston and Kaohsiung (Figure 9).

GOING BEYOND TERMINAL OPERATIONS: INTEGRATION STRATEGIES IN THE HINTERLAND

The rise of and diversity in global terminal operators is having a structural impact on the port industry. Olivier [7] and Olivier and Slack [33] argue that the emergence of global terminal operators required a reconceptualisation of the conventional port as a fixed and spatial entity to a network of terminal operating firms under a corporate logic. This reality also puts the role and function of terminals in a new perspective. Heaver [34] asserts that terminals rather than ports are adversaries in the competitive struggle between ports. Robinson [35] underlines that terminals are in essence through locations or elements in logistics pathways from sellers to buyers. The value creation process of a terminal is thus linked to the specific attributes of the supply chains that run through the terminal and the logistics network configuration in which the terminal plays a role. Rodrigue and Notteboom [36] refer to a terminalisation process in supply chains with a more active role for terminals and terminal networks in shaping global logistics path solutions.

As terminal operators are urged towards a better integration of terminals in supply chains and shipping lines are acquiring container terminal assets worldwide, leading terminal operating companies are developing diverging strategies towards the control of larger parts of the supply chain.

The door-to-door philosophy has transformed a number of terminal operators into logistics organizations and/or organizers/operators of inland services. Not every terminal operator is integrating by acquiring or setting-up separate companies or business units. In many cases, effective network integration is realized through better co-ordination with third-party transport operators or logistics service providers, a strategy known
as hinterland access regimes \[^{37}\]. The services offered include warehousing, distribution and low-end value-added logistical services (e.g. customizing products for the local markets).

 Particularly in Europe, a number of terminal operators have integrated inland terminals in their logistics networks or have a direct involvement in rail and barge operations \[^{38}\] \[^{36}\]. Maersk Line wants to push containers into the hinterland supported by its terminal branch APM Terminals and its rail branches. HPH-owned ECT in Rotterdam has followed an active strategy of acquiring key inland terminals acting as extended gates to its deepsea terminals, e.g. a rail terminal in Venlo (the Netherlands), DeCeTe terminal in Duisburg (Germany) and TCT Belgium in Willebroek (Belgium). DP World is following a similar strategy working in partnership with CMA CGM to streamline intermodal operations on the Seine and Rhône axes, while the large terminals of Antwerp Gateway (open since 2005) and London Gateway (future project) are both linked to inland centres in the hinterland. Terminal operators can play an instrumental role in bringing together intermodal volumes of competing lines and as such create a basis for improved or even new intermodal services.

 The globalization strategies of terminal operators are accompanied by the regionalization of their hinterlands in regions (e.g. Western Europe) where market situations and opportunities justify such a strategy \[^{39}\]. In other regions, global operators have been extremely hesitant to vertically integrate. Olivier \[^{30}\] identifies two main factors that hold back full vertical integration of operators. First of all, global terminal operators do not wish to enter business segments in which their own customers have a presence in order not to compromise their business relations. Secondly, in the case of Asian conglomerates, sister firms perform activities in other segments of the supply chain such that when taking a conglomerate perspective, the entire business group has involvement in all aspects of the supply chain.

 CONCLUSIONS

 The last 20 years have seen the emergence of a truly global container port operation industry. Although this globalism is far from being uniform, the four major terminal operators (HPH, APM, PSA and DPW) have a strong globally-oriented portfolio, each with a specific regional orientation linked with its history and its growth strategies. Like many multinational corporations, global terminal operators are market seekers.

 The corporate geography of container terminal operators underlines that they have played an active role in the standardization of management
practices among different port locations, creating multiplying effects to the functional and operational benefits brought by containerization. Vertical and horizontal integration in the terminal and shipping industry and a search for portfolio diversification among financial investors have contributed to the global expansion of port operators. On one side, maritime shipping companies went into the terminal operation business to help secure maritime traffic and the profitability of both seaside and landside operations. On the other, stevedore companies expanded their operations from their base port or region into new markets to diversify and replicate their business model, which is linked with terminal performance. Organic growth (new terminals) as well as mergers and acquisitions of existing facilities (and operators) were common strategies, in which terminal operators differ little from their manufacturing and retail counterparts in view of globalization.

Complex and geographically diversified portfolios were thus established in virtually every production and consumption market of the world. The container terminal has become a fundamental node in global freight distribution, with the managerial and operational expertise offered by global holdings an important element in its performance in terms of capacity and reliability. As such, their corporate geography underlines a global system of managerial and physical interactions that tend to be overlooked in light of the global supply chains they are embedded in.

Last, terminals and their operators are part of business cycles, implying that they grow until most business opportunities are captured and their rate of return declines. The fast pace of growth, mergers and acquisitions in recent years underlines that the industry may be close to achieve a level of maturity. The discussion on the reaction of terminal operators to the challenges posed by the economic crisis demonstrated that operating margins in the industry have not been affected as much as in the liner shipping industry due to the implementation of extensive and effective cost-control programs. Global terminal operators are hedging risks through revising ownership and partnership structures with shipping lines. A key aspect to the rationalization in the industry is a more selective investment policy leading to a greater focus on emerging markets, the cancellation or postponement of terminal projects and rearrangements in terminal portfolios through sale, equity swaps and divesture. The more prudent investment approach has also affected inland strategies with a greater focus on revenue generation, cost control and value creation to the customer. A question remains about if rationalization would inevitably lead to consolidation as it is commonly the case in other activity sectors.
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