What Socrates Said --, and Why Gorgias and Polus Did Not Respond:

A Reading of Socrates’ Definition of Rhetoric

in *Gorgias* 461-466

Bernard E. Jacob

This paper is an effort -- which none of the characters in the dialogue make -- to listen carefully to Socrates’ most famous attack on rhetoric. This locus classicus is found in the *Gorgias* within the opening pages (461-466) of Socrates’ conversation with Polus. In it he charges that rhetoric, Gorgias’ skill, is a defective art and no more than base sucking up or flattery. He completes his condemnation by likening rhetoric, as Shakespeare’s Faulconbridge does, a millennium and a half later, to “sweet, sweet, sweet poison for the age’s tooth,” (*King John*, I, I), a debased confection in place of healthy food.

‘Alexander M. Bickel Distinguished Professor of Communications Law, School of Law, Hofstra University. A version of this paper was delivered at the American Society for the History of Rhetoric preconvention to the NCA Convention in Chicago, IL on November 19, 1997. I wish to express my thanks for questions and comments from Professors Michael C. Leff, R. Leo Enos, and Edward Schiappa. I wish to acknowledge a more general debt to Professor Seth Benardete, of New York University and the New School for Social Research; he taught me what I understand about the *Gorgias* and about Plato; he taught me, too, that Platonic dialogues are life-like in yet one more way: they do not yield up their message without difficulty and perplexity. All these teachers are, of course, free from any responsibility for what I say.”
It is not only characters in the dialogue who fail to make a searching inquiry into Socrates’ condemnation. Many rhetors since that time, smarting from the sting of what Plato has Socrates say about rhetoric, have taken the passage as unproblematically expressing a blanket condemnation of rhetoric. But I believe it is not necessary to read Socrates’ condemnation of rhetoric in that fashion, and I attempt a reading in which the condemnation is less absolute.

In the interest of disclosure I should say that I undertake this analysis in an Aristotelian spirit. My interest in the passage began with Aristotle’s allusion to it in the opening sentence of his *Art of Rhetoric* (*Rhet.* 1354a) and continues to be guided by what I believe Aristotle has to teach about rhetoric. It is also guided by a realization that Plato, a dramatic poet, achieves his effect, in dramas that have little overt action, almost entirely by rhetoric, that is, by the creation of a coherent voice through which we approach each character. Whatever Plato’s ultimate understanding of the relation of wisdom and art (Roochnik, 1996), any argument that Plato has contempt for rhetoric must, sooner or later, deal with his constant and loving use of it in his work.

The passage in question forms the first part -- about a fifth of the bulk -- of Socrates’ dialogic encounter with Polus. This paper is thus limited to reflection on a fragmentary part of that encounter, for Socrates’ condemnation of a rhetoric emerges in four Stephanus pages. Nevertheless, it is a fragment that, like all of the pieces of a Platonic dialogue, spirals into place in the larger encounter and beyond that in the dialogue as a whole. I argue that our assessment of Socrates’ argument is decisively affected by our grasp of the dramatic context in which it appears in several decisive ways.
One obvious event that demands dramatic explanation is Polus' intervention in what had been a discussion between Gorgias himself and Socrates and his subsequent ineptness. Indeed, Polus is so inept, that the pages barely qualify as part of a conversation, or at least a conversation with Polus. What we have is more honestly described as Socrates' statement about rhetoric, which itself escalates to an exposition so elaborately figurative and unclear in its detail, that Socrates himself has to apologize for its undialectical length and break it off without finishing. Socrates' critique can take this form because until the end of our passage Polus is constrained to role-play as Gorgias and to permit a continuation of the discussion with Gorgias by indirect means. The indirect nature of the conversation provides Socrates with a privileged position from which to make his attack, but by the same measure -- it is overtly addressed to Polus who has little interest in it -- Gorgias and everyone else who speaks is privileged to let it pass without comment and does.

Yet Polus had begun (461a) by pushing his way into a silence in the exchange between Socrates and Gorgias. I believe Polus intervenes at this point to make what he regards as a knock-out argument that will bowl Socrates over and end the discussion. But Polus' argument is held back, suspended over the passage we are reading, until, at its end, Polus is permitted to speak at last and diverts Socrates from a discussion about the nature of rhetoric into a dispute about the nature of power. Compelled to play a disabled Gorgias and his own intention frustrated, Polus fails to respond to Socrates' main arguments about rhetoric.

The diversion effected by the release of Polus' suspended argument is a turning
point in the dialogue and the end of the passage we are attending. Polus’ diversion of the discussion away from the nature of rhetoric is, I believe, a "dialogic proof" that rhetoric and political life are inseparable; for just after Socrates claims that rhetoric, though far from being justness, is attached to it as to a model, Polus shows he, too, believes that arguments about rhetoric must be played out in a discussion of political life.

Socrates has compelled Polus, if he is to speak at all, first to take on Gorgias’ position rather than his own. And the Gorgias for whom Polus is forced to stand in, is already off-center because, as Thomas Lewis shows in his 1986 article, "Refutative Rhetoric as True Rhetoric in the Gorgias," Socrates has at this point stolen Gorgias’ audience from him (Lewis, 1986). In that article, Lewis locates the dialogue, not in Gorgias’ home as is sometimes thought, but in a public place, where Gorgias’ display will have, as one of its unspoken purposes, the winning of new students. Socrates comes into that place with a desire to provoke and attract some of the energetic and well-off young men who might study philosophy. Socrates succeeds in his intention by bringing Gorgias to a halt in serious talk. Where he had begun at Gorgias’ sufferance, he now takes center stage. It is because he has already substituted his own "refute or be refuted" in place of the originally scheduled display of Gorgian rhetoric, that he can compel Polus to participate, as Gorgias did, in a non-Gorgian exercise.

After Socrates has maneuvered him into this requirement, Polus elects to pose rather than answer questions, plausibly tempted by what he thinks is an opportunity to give Socrates some of his own unpleasant medicine. In doing so, he is distracted -temporarily- into a conversation very different from the one he intended to initiate. For a time Polus
loses sight of his knock-out argument. Instead, role-playing Gorgias at the end of
Socrates’ leading string, he asks Socrates to say what this rhetoric is.

Socrates’ responds by asking if the question is about an art of rhetoric. Polus is
startled when Socrates then denies that rhetoric is an art. His being startled is justified; he
has wrongly trusted the implications of Socrates’ terminology, and Socrates has abused
that trust in order to discomfort him. Later in the dialogue we might discover why Socrates
chooses to humiliate Polus, but here it can only be understood to show, in the cruelest and
crudest possible way, the difference in skill between Polus and Socrates.

So begins our text. Over the next four pages Socrates pushes Polus around while
he defines and expounds his conception of rhetoric by making his points, each criticizing
and deprecating rhetoric. Polus, in his proper person, finds Gorgias’ role too large for him.
After he has been made to listen to Socrates’ speeches, he seems unable to respond to
them.

Thus, Socrates delivers a condemnation of rhetoric, the text we are trying to read,
without searching criticism within the dialogue itself and avoiding direct confrontation with
the formidable Gorgias. Gorgias, distanced as he is, also finds it easier to remain silent
under Socrates’ attack, so much so that Socrates proceeds with Gorgias’ permission and
even support.

A. How Rhetoric Can Become Reflective
The seeds for Polus' amazement when Socrates denies rhetoric is an art have been sown carefully. First, the entire conversation with Gorgias presupposed that he possessed an art, though its definition seemed strangely elusive. Second, the suffix attached to the Greek *rhetorikê* implies fitness or ability. It is an honorific that would have suggested, in the first instance, that rhetoric was the art relating to the activity of being a speaker. Thus Socrates has doubly set Polus up.

In that way Socrates' claim, that rhetoric is no art at all, has -- at Polus' expense -- heightened shock value. Rhetoric regresses: it is experience in doing that sort of thing (*empeiria*), that is, in speaking, and persistent effort expended on it. Socrates notes that Polus himself had written that experience was what produces an art. The distinction that Socrates makes between *empeiria* and *technê* sends translators scurrying. It is, first of all, confusingly, a distinction in which "art" is the natural English translation for both Greek words. For we say that medicine is an art as well as a science, meaning that it eventuates in treatment of an individual in an act that requires special perception and individualized judgment for its application. Or we say that training horses in an art, and not a science, meaning that equestrian science is limited or lacking, but one can nevertheless acquire an extensive knowledge and keenness of judgment without being in the least able to articulate it as a set of general principles. So translators lamely attempt to find words to capture Socrates' charge that rhetoric has a lowered cognitive status.

Thus Socrates' first charge is that rhetoric is both dumb and, for that reason, a pseudo-art. At first sight Socrates' assumption that being inarticulate is a serious defect seems to run counter, not only to English usage, but to common sense. As Terence Irwin
says, there is a great difference between knowing how and knowing that, and both are forms of knowledge (Irwin, p. 135). That assertion does not depend on the vagaries of the English word "art." Later I try to indicate one reason why one might prefer to have, rather than not have, a self-conscious or reflective artfulness if that is available.

Socrates' explanation of why rhetoric is but a matter, at best, of taste, is delayed and only partly explicated. He first spins out his description of not one, but eight arts or pseudo-arts, before he gives a reason for denying rhetoric status as a self-conscious art. This explanation -- that it cannot assign causes -- is then asserted with an offer of supporting arguments (465A), which are never called for. Yet Socrates' actual point about rhetoric's lack of artfulness greatly ameliorates the apparent absoluteness of his condemnation of rhetoric. That point, I believe, is explained later in the dialogue (501A) when, in another context, Socrates himself remarks that all four forms of what he has called flattery could progress through an investigation of the nature and causes of pleasure. If this is true, it means that Socrates would, if pressed, admit that rhetoric only adventitiously lacks, up to the time he is speaking, some theoretical part that would explicate the nature of its routines; and acquiring that theoretical part would cause an art of rhetoric to emerge.

Aristotle provides a measure of help here. He, too, quotes Polus; but where Polus emphasizes only that settled experience or skill is a necessary condition for the existence of any art, in Aristotle (Meta. A1) the emphasis is on the fact that such settled experience is not a sufficient condition for treating a mere skill as an art, for an art has an added -- and divine (Boon, 71) -- dimension of understanding what is to be effected within a broader causal background.
In the *Phaedrus* just this accusation that rhetoric lacks a intellectual grasp of what it is doing, is considered at greater length than it is in the *Gorgias* (Ferrari, 1987, pp. 68-85; see also Burger, 1980). There Socrates says medical skill is not merely an ability to recite symptoms and procedures, but an ability to understand how and when they are to guide treatment and be applied. There is effective art only when there is an integrating grasp of symptoms and procedures in a dynamic system that allows one to know when and how symptoms are to be read and cures applied. This is not to ask that the rhetoric be engaged in mechanically applying a rule or algorithm, as G. R. F. Ferrari shows in *Listening to the Cicadas*. The effort is open-ended; it is rather, says Ferrari, taking account of finding what is appropriate to a given situation, and giving account of discrete symptoms in relation to "that of which they are symptoms." Artful rhetoric must look beyond the symptoms to the human nature of the audience and to the nature of the human power of speech in recognizing what is appropriate. In doing so, the artful speaker will have provided an important theoretical basis and, at the same time, will have "successfully accounted for the very unaccountability of this power of recognition" (Ferrari, p. 80).

When Aristotle purports to identify an Art of Rhetoric, the critical move is from considering rhetoric as an undefined "device for persuasion" to finding the heart of rhetoric in argument and in discovering or inventing that which is *pithanon*, that which is persuasive or plausible in a particular case and from some point of view. For Aristotle rhetoric does not have a determinate subject-matter as arithmetic has, for example (Roochnik, 1996), since it is a facility in argument. But it can and must give itself an extrinsically determined
subject-matter if it is to be an art at all. Aristotle's definition of rhetoric is completed by seeing that rhetoric concerns itself with deliberation about matters of human importance and is therefore necessarily political (Rhet. 1357a).

This is what rhetoric is about. Of course, it aims at persuasion, but there is a gap between what is persuasive and persuasion. Art has its limits. It is not "some device of persuasion," which cannot and need not be further explained. Socrates' accusation that rhetoric is not yet an art was already prefigured when Gorgias accepted Socrates' reference to rhetoric in these words (459C). The result is that Socrates, in the Gorgias, says nothing of any such conception of an artful rhetoric that is supplied with a theoretical part. The rhetoric he is discussing, and condemning, entirely lacks theory and simply presents itself in the concrete context of preparing for public assemblies and legal proceedings.

One consequence of this defect of a theoretical part is that, without such a part, it is particularly difficult to separate out what is properly rhetorical from political action in general. The Greek word compounds this intertwining. Gorgias may find the confusion acceptable; Socrates believes that it facilitates a powerful and self-corrupting delusion.

B. The Build-Up against Rhetoric

Socrates has more to say about his conception of rhetoric. And Polus, almost on
direction, provides him with the opportunity to say that having skill in rhetoric and good cooking (opsopoia or opsopoikê) alike are a kind of taste for pleasing, not the same thing and yet parts of one practice. But then Socrates claims he is constrained by embarrassment in the next step in his exposition.

What embarrassment? He should be embarrassed that, in completing his condemnation of rhetoric, he will necessarily abandon dialectical exchange in favor of harangue. For, throughout the dialogue, he insists on the superiority, in all points, of dialogue to harangue and long disquisition. And yet he adopts the very modes and purposes he attacks. Socrates complains that Polus is committing an intellectual faux pas by insisting on praising rhetoric before he knows what it is; but Socrates himself is also primarily concerned with praise and blame, that is, with the condemnation of rhetoric.

Nor does Socrates wish to embarrass Gorgias and precipitate an overtly hostile confrontation with Gorgias. Socrates the dialectician has turned away from direct confrontation when he undertakes to continue his conversation with Gorgias through Polus. Socrates has already made Polus a human buffer for his speech, but at this crucial moment that is not enough. Now he makes a show of hesitating, lest, he says, he seem rude to Gorgias. His hesitation works. Gorgias himself intervenes to assure Socrates that he will not be embarrassed, whatever Socrates should have to say. Thomas Lewis, again, seems correct in suggesting that Gorgias understands by now that the audience will want to hear the monstrous things Socrates may have to say about rhetoric, so that Gorgias will not gain in the long run by trying to stop him. (Lewis, 1986)

Despite Gorgias' encouragement, Socrates's next remarks continue to provoke
rather than clarify. He has been asked to explain the connection he has asserted between
fine cooking and rhetoric. Instead of clarifying this bizarre leap, his remarks only add to the
unresolved tensions of his speech.

Socrates's response to Gorgias' encouragement begins well when he says (463a)
that the practitioner he has in mind, has some virtues; he is good at guessing, willing to
take a chance and not risk-adverse, and terribly clever at dealing with people. These are
the virtues, after all, that Isocrates in his Against the Sophists (17) has already listed as the
praise-worthy underpinnings of effective speaking. Socrates' first words here are a
catalogue of the accepted virtues of the speaker, the man of politics.
But the daring to take risks and having a commanding presence in social groups that still
characterize such a person turns out to be, in the end, in service only to the most base sort
of flattery. This is a substantive objection to the practice of rhetoric, indeed, if Socrates
can make the charge stick. But he now elaborates his argument in a puzzling fashion.

Where one would expect him to exhibit the strongest proof he possesses that will
demonstrate the connection between rhetoric and kolakeia, base flattery, Socrates simply
adds to the list of diverse forms of servility with which rhetoric is now to be aligned. This is
ineffective character assassination by association unless there is more to come that will
explain what is now being said.

Let us be clear about how strong the condemnation is. Socrates' word, kolakeia,
means an excessive flattery that goes far beyond civility, respect and decency. It is almost
always to be understood as motivated by a desire for underhanded gain and shames its
practitioner. It carries a heavy burden of disdain; no one would want to be accused of it -- a
kind of sucking up to another. Even Dodds, constrained by very different conventions of polite speech than we are, says that the kolax, the flatterer, is: toad-eater, lick-spittle, and, though he does soften it by attributing the term to the English schoolboy, bumsucker. All the dead metaphors spring to ugly life.

Socrates has taken off in an unexpected direction. The forms of flattery are many and diverse, and this is important to Socrates for reasons he has not yet disclosed. The actual answer to Polus’ understandable question as to what unites rhetoric and good cooking in their slapdash character is only that they are driven by a motive of base flattery. But Socrates goes on. Good cooking, he says, has the reputation of being an art, just as rhetoric does. But Socrates at least, thinks good cooking is no more than experience in pleasing the palate.

He adds to the stew of which fine cooking and rhetoric have become main ingredients. He adds, first, a novelty, something he calls art of make-up and adornment, kommôtikê, which, for want of a better translation, I call dressery, the dresser’s art. He stops after adding sophistry, another term that then and now draws controversial praise and conventional disdain. Thus Socrates’ accusation that Gorgian rhetoric is only a form of sucking up or flattery is now swathed in the four forms of flattery. Socrates blames his digression somehow on the multiform sinuosity of flattery itself -- that the four pseudo-arts share a common bottom line.

Socrates is not yet done. He needs to continue to blunt Polus’s effort to drag the issue back to the admiration that people generally accord to rhetoric. Socrates too understands that the presence of the crowd on the present occasion shows how powerful
that admiration is. But before he goes on, Socrates is still concerned about appearing to speak at too great a length. He demands that Polus cooperate by formally asking a question that will move Socrates' speech along. Ask what sort of form of flattery rhetoric may be, he asks. Polus accommodates. "A phantom fragment of the art of the political," is Socrates’ answer. Polus welcomes Socrates' characterization of this rhetoric; it seems to allow him to return to the basic fact -- that neither Socrates nor he, and no one present in the crowd around them could deny -- of the recognized status of rhetoric. Socrates stifles his efforts. He counters that rhetoric, as he sees it, is disgraceful and vicious. Thus Socrates' political characterization is not taken up.

When Gorgias intervenes to say that even he cannot understand where Socrates has gotten to, Socrates turns to blame again. It is Polus' fault that Socrates' argument is not clearly set forth, Socrates tells Gorgias about Polus: he is too young and skittish, too eager to get to the argument he wants to unleash. As a result he does not notice the uncompleted argument that I am setting before him. Gorgias licenses Socrates to speak at length.

It is, I believe, fair to say that at this point the tensions in Socrates’ argument are now at a maximum, and they are unresolved. Those tensions arise from a number of sources. There is the explicit conundrum of the four pseudo-artistic forms of flattery. This is a tension that Socrates demands the right to resolve by explication, an explication that Gorgias, speaking for the whole audience, insists he provide.

But several other tensions are also present. There is the tension between Socrates and Gorgias that is preserved by Socrates' continuing his discussion with Gorgias in the
guise of a conversation with Polus. There is the tension of our waiting to hear what argument Polus has in mind, a tension that can only grow as we are successively made to wait because his efforts to express himself are frustrated by Socrates with such contemptuous ease.

The last tension can only be resolved through the entire remaining dialogue: how are the commanding figures of accomplished speakers to be reconciled with what Socrates is saying, that their basic commitment is to an absurd and degrading undertaking, to base flattery? All three unmentioned sources of tension, I believe, contribute give unarticulated but palpable force to Socrates' condemnation of rhetoric. Socrates, backpedaling from confrontation with Gorgias on this issue, disarmingly says (463a) this rhetoric may not be identical with Gorgias' practice.

C. Socrates Becomes Too Rhetorical

Socrates has gotten the reply he needs. Forget Polus, says Gorgias, and develop your argument. Socrates stops only to obtain several formal verbal concessions from Gorgias. First, one can speak of body and of soul; there is a good and healthy state with respect to each; and also, there are cases in which there is a facade or appearance of health, without its reality. Thus, there is, perhaps, an eidos of political life and its fraudulent image, an eidôlon or little eidos (Brann, Kalkavage & Salem, 92). It is from these two premises that Socrates takes off.
He does not, however, resolve the tensions his speeches have created. The tensions only increase and become more frustrating. It is true that he interrupts himself to tell what he means by saying that rhetoric is not an art. We have already looked at that meaning: the artlessness of rhetoric is not, after all, something inherent in the practice, but is due to a lack of a theoretic part for Gorgian rhetoric and, so, a lack of self-understanding. But though Socrates does something to clarify his more serious charge that all rhetoric is flattery, he also multiplies the number of terms that might cast some light on the point in issue without showing, specifically, how they do so.

Socrates has already identified four pseudo-arts that are no more than virtuoso exercises in debasing flattery. Yet his manner in doing so makes it difficult to know how serious Socrates is. His list of pseudo-arts, for example, is laced with playful neologisms. Certainly, dressery (κομμῶτική) is a word unique to Plato; and when he dresses up ὀπσοποιία (good cooking) as ὀπσοποιίκη (the pretentious pseudo-art of good cooking), this also may be a novelty. And these novelties, destined to leave little record outside of Plato and Aristotle, may all be the frame that Plato used to impose, successfully and forever, the name ῥητορική on Gorgias’ skill with logos, replacing both that word and its competitor ῥητορεία (Schiappa, 1991; Cole, 1990). At the same time, he hardly addresses the only point that seems pertinent to the dialogue, that is, whether rhetoric necessarily commits its practitioners to a life of debasing flattery.

In his speech, Socrates’ next step begins with two pairs of “true” arts. One pair is familiar enough: medicine and physical training are devoted to the care and good health of
the body. The other two "arts" are more problematic: One of these, nomothetikê, law-making, may be another coined word. Nevertheless, they, justness (dikaiosunê) and law-making -- collectively to be called politics -- are simply described as devoted to the care of the soul as medicine and physical training are devoted to the care of the body. What we know about them, we know only through our knowledge of medicine and physical training.

These four, we are given to understand, are the originals. Daring flattery perceives these by luck, indeed only guesses at their shape, and takes over in a fourfold articulation that has already been prefigured in the pseudo-arts, to make a show of providing, in each of the four cases, a true and praise-worthy way of caring for the soul or the body. The daring practitioner of a pseudo-art, now depersonalized as flattery itself, cares nothing, in this alien clothing, for what is best, but hunts the fool. And when it finds the fool, it seduces the fool into thinking it is most worth because it always gives pleasure up front. The example is the way good cooking may subvert medicine. Socrates takes the case when medicine and good cooking have become competitors, and the competition, if judged by children or childish men, will always be to medicine's disadvantage. The doctor will get no business and himself die of starvation.

Socrates makes one more attempt to be concrete. He starts to explain his made-up art, the art of dressery. It results, he says, are mischievous, deceptive, ignoble, servile; doing tricks with stays or pads, with make-up, unguents and draperies; and it stifles any inclination to take up a more strenuous and healthful regime and to achieve a more lasting and natural attractiveness. Socrates emphasizes how, in fine but unhealthy cooking and in dressery, the two strands of the vice of that flattery known as kolakeia are brought together
-- the illusion of pleasure and gain at another's expense.

With that, however, detailed explication ceases. Instead of giving more specifics, Socrates retreats to what he calls his mathematical mode. He justifies his joinder of all these terms only by placing them in pairs in the same proportion. He has succeeded in linking all eight of the terms he has invoked, but tells us only this much about them: As dressery is to physical training, so sophistry to constitution-making; and as fine cooking is to medicine, so rhetoric to justice.

Here the argument breaks down, and Socrates' explication is curtailed. What has happened to Socrates' project of explaining the charge that rhetoric can be described only as a form of flattery and is as base as the flattery it embodies? Socrates says that he is stopping, lest he make a long, rhetorical speech (*makrologô*). For the second time, the dramatic aspect of Plato's writing intrudes.

What can this change in direction mean? Certainly, it means that Socrates admits that he cannot complete his purposes without rhetoric, even as he claims that he is stopping to avoid rhetoric. For Socrates is in the midst of a long, rhetorical speech whether we have in mind his latest block of words or the entire passage since Polus intervened. Very shortly Socrates even apologizes for this and offers a traditional reason for employing rhetoric: he is facing, in Polus, he says, a hostile and resistant audience. Therefore, I think that the breakdown is itself intentional and forms part of the rhetoric of the passage. It is a stopping short. That signals a number of different things about Socrates' charge and the arts and pseudo-arts he has introduced in such numbers.

First, Socrates has certainly has given prominence to and firmly made the point that
rhetoric, like gourmandizing, can work corruption and do harm to those who accept it without a thought. Second, since he cuts his account short, we may infer that Socrates would admit that his definition of rhetoric as flattery, though passionately insisted on, is incomplete in some way. And at the same time, if he is correct, the story of rhetoric in its entirety will have to take into account, in some form, all of the arts and counter-arts that Socrates has put into play; each of them has suggestive iconic qualities that will repay consideration.

Lastly, Socrates has also asserted that there can be no adequate account of rhetoric that leaves out either political life or justness; he has done that by linking both terms in the Divided Oblong (as Robinson & Plochman call the eight-terms set in proportion). One could say that Socrates in his discussion with Gorgias drove a wedge between rhetoric and politics, a separation that Gorgias would have preferred to de-emphasize (Schiappa 1991) and, then, here claims that rhetoric is nevertheless inseparable from political life no matter how far it falls short of constituting such a life.

Socrates does not claim he has said all that can be said about the nature of rhetoric; he stops short, he says, to avoid a longer speech. The reflective reader will note that the account that we do have suggests it is an incomplete one. What Socrates has said about cooking, for example, is that, in those cases where rich cooking and bland if necessary diets come into conflict, there is no question as to which is tastier. The conflict, the reflective reader notes, is not a necessary one; much good cooking can be in the service of making a bland diet more palatable.

The lack of completeness and definiteness in Socrates' account is only underlined
by the fact that, in the dialogue, Socrates will soon persuade Polus and then silence Callicles by something that is by no means flattering and yet falls far short of demonstration. Many contemporary commentators have claimed that Polus is taken in by shoddy logic (Vlastos, Berman, Curtis N. Johnson, MacKenzie, McKim and, in a way, Kahn) and a deceptive rhetoric. What Socrates practices here and throughout the remainder of the dialogue is the rhetorical anti-rhetoric of condemnation. Is that not also part of rhetoric? As is the more private rhetoric of the *Phaedrus*? Socrates fails to insist he has treated rhetoric as a whole and silently admits his treatment of rhetoric is a partial one. Socrates’ charge that rhetoric is no art is only true in a sense, and now we see that Socrates’ second charge is only a part of the story about rhetoric.

I think we learn, also, that a fuller definition of rhetoric will have to use all eight of the items, and their inter-relations, as resources. What these relations are, is far from clear. Socrates does say that the mathematical proportion in question is like that of strophe and antistrophe. But relation, also, is also carefully neutral; to invoke strophe and antistrophe does little more than suggest the second member -- though similar to the first -- is subordinate in so far as it formally follows after. The blankness of the relation, however, should not deceive us into believing it serves no purpose, just as the mathematical bareness of the four sets of terms in the same ratio does not prevent that assertion from telling us *something* about the practices that are linked. Listing the analogical terms amounts to no more than an itinerary, but it may be a useful itinerary. The map which will completely describe the relations of the practices remains to be drawn, and the travel story about our experience with them remains to be written. But we know for what we must give
an account, and we know something about the relative positions of the individual elements.

Let us look, just for a moment, at some implications of the icons that Socrates has invoked. Some are dialectical commonplaces. Medicine can serve for an analogy to a certain kind of counsel or statecraft. A second icon, sophistry, might lead us to Aristotle. It seems clear that Aristotle means to introduce a treatment of rhetoric that is more complete than Socrates’ and, thus, emphasizes also the more favorable aspects of rhetoric. Rhetoric is an art for Aristotle, and he provides a theoretic underpinning to support that claim. He introduces that treatment by saying that rhetoric is an antistrophe to dialectic. In Socrates’ treatment, rhetoric is related to sophistry and dialectic is not mentioned. But Aristotle says that sophistry and dialectic are the same in content, but different in the moral quality of their use; in the case of rhetoric, the same word covers both morally good and wicked rhetoric (Rh., 1355bl7). One might say, at this point, that there are two kinds of sophistry (sophistry and dialectic), and two kinds of rhetoric.

There are also two kinds of fine cooking. Socrates himself says that there are morally acceptable roles for good cooking. In the short dialogue Euthydemus Socrates is telling his friend Crito about a conversation between himself and Cleinias, an attractive young man, that is sparked by and shares the stage with two clowning word-artists, the brothers Euthydemus and Dionysodorus. Cleinias, whose argument Socrates praises, insists that, like huntsmen and fishermen who must hand their catch over to cooks (opsopoiikê) or else their catch is of no use to them or to us, geometers, astronomers, and calculators must turn over their discoveries to dialecticians if ever they are to be used properly.
The attentive reader will think, along with Cleinias, of the role of all cooking, fine or good cooking as well as the more quotidian sort, as a needed preparation for enjoying the benefits of most human food. Similarly, it is almost more a commonplace to assert that rhetoric also plays a preparative role, mediating between promised benefits of a course of action and the suspicious fears of one mistrustful of those benefits. In fact, Gorgias himself had used this trope in speaking to Socrates; but there the discussion was quickly diverted away from the role of rhetoric as a mediation between two modes of thought. Instead Gorgias is made to appear as if he thought that his ability to assist his physician brother in calming patients’ fear somehow made him superior in skill to his brother, but, of course, it was for the sake of his brother’s skill that his persuasive speech was made.

Nevertheless, one can understand the claim of Pierre Aubenque in *Le Probleme de l’être chez Aristote*, that Cleinias’ analogy, though ascribed to dialectic, is really Gorgian in spirit (Aubenque, 252n). Perhaps this remark, and the reference to Gorgias and his physician brother, should remind us that Socrates will soon be making use of Gorgias’ argument to his brother’s patients (that painfully effective medical remedies may be needful) to support praise of punishment and chastisement, a praise of which Polus approves. In our passage Socrates has focused on the use of a flattering rhetoric, but we can say that he still knows that one must accept the rhetor’s role in making seemingly inhuman solutions humanly acceptable. One finds these better counterparts to flattering rhetoric and to fine but unhealthy cuisine by fair inferences that are grounded in Socrates’ seemingly hostile, iconic and *partial* description of rhetoric.
D. The Icons of Rhetoric

Socrates has stopped short in his exposition, and he leaves us with what amounts to an iconic itinerary, an eight-point index to an adequate discussion of rhetoric. But this is already a rich resource, if we are willing to try to unpack, in an imaginative way, what Socrates' complex metaphor suggests. I will do no more than mention one other way to go: It has long been a common-place of scholarship that Plato's *Gorgias* is suggestive of a four-way confrontation about the nature of rhetoric, whose participants are Gorgias, Plato, Isocrates and Aristotle. I have already remarked on Aristotle's allusion to our passage in making his own defense of an *Art of Rhetoric*. We can add with him Gorgias and Isocrates.

Where Socrates speaks of rhetoric as antistrophic to the medical art, Gorgias has written of rhetoric as a *pharmakon*, an ambivalent drug, in his *Helen*. And we have already noticed a possible echo between key statements made by Socrates in this passage and in Isocrates' *Against the Sophists*. There is another, and more directly relevant concinnation between Plato and Isocractes: the role Socrates assigns training (*gymnastikê*) in the Divided Oblong and the central role in the development of rhetorical skill that Isocrates assigns to a figurative *gymnastikê* of the mind or soul in *Antidosis*, Isocrates' final summing up of his life and achievements. Here there is a puzzle about the relative dates of the three works, but some sort of interaction is clearly underway. (Schiappa, 1999)
What these incidents of play might mean will require much further work. For example, someone might say that Socrates’ insistence on medicine while Gorgias compares persuasive speech to a pharmakon is a reprise of Socrates’ insistence that rhetoric must be guided by a theoretic part as against Gorgias’ willingness to live with the ambivalence of the cure/poison of speech that is to be held in the speaker’s hands. But how do we evaluate the two models of rhetoric? Before one attempts that evaluation, we must understand, as far as possible, what Socrates and Gorgias mean by their respective icons of rhetoric. We speak now of Socrates’ meaning. But Gorgias also deserves to be heard, and to be heard free, as much as possible from both from the unstated assumptions that rhetoric cannot stand up against “philosophy” and from the equally arrogant presupposition that what Gorgias -- and indeed authors prior to his time -- have to offer is merely a defective and primitive version of later rhetorical pedagogy. They deserve, instead, what has been called a “predisciplinary” hearing free of such presuppositions (Schiappa, 1996), which will frustrate any effort to provide an adequate hearing. Instead, we need to follow the direction of scholars such as Biesecker, Engnell, Gronbeck, deRomilly, Enos (1993), Jarratt, Poulakis, Schiappa, Wardy. The works of these scholars have revived the study of Gorgias and Isocrates. For our purposes, however, we must put off a deeper reading of the icons just as Socrates himself did.

E. Rhetoric’s Strength, Its Weakness
In reading Socrates’ attack on rhetoric in the *Gorgias* I have tried to make use of two dramatic or dialogical points. The first point is that the entire passage is framed by Polus’ frustrated anxiety to make what he regards as a knock-out argument against Socrates. This leaves Polus even more tongue-tied and inadequate, perhaps, than he would otherwise be. It also leaves us wondering about his suspended argument. The second dramatic point, permits us to conclude that Socrates’ attack on rhetoric -- his explication that is never questioned in the dialogue -- should be understood as intentionally stopping short of fully stating Socrates’ understanding of rhetoric.

These dramatic or dialogical events allow for a rehabilitated rhetoric. If rhetoric is, in Gorgias’ hands, without a theoretic part necessary to its claiming status as an art, such a theoretically grounded rhetoric is possible in ways that Socrates discusses in the *Phaedrus* and Aristotle purports to achieve in the *Art of Rhetoric*. Socrates' attack on rhetoric as only a form of flattery turns out to be an attack on an important, particularly dangerous, and even corrupting rhetoric, but Socrates is not foreclosed from discussing elsewhere other forms of rhetoric, such as the punitive anti-rhetoric, which he will soon call “true rhetoric” (480). We have rehabilitated rhetoric and in a sense made it safe for us and, incidentally, for Plato in his dialogues.

At this point, we must still touch on two topics before our current reading is completed. First, we have to look at what Socrates means by a rhetoric of flattery and what he sees as its dangers. Although he fails to make that clear in the current passage, I believe that the arguments and the action of the entire dialogue provide adequate materials to permit a sketch of such a rhetoric. Second, we must see what proof is offered
for the claim, inherent in the linking of politics and justness in the Divided Oblong, that rhetoric cannot be discussed apart from political life, although equally surely, it cannot be identified with that life.

Let us begin with the disappearance of persuasion. Socrates had been willing, throughout the discussion with Gorgias, to discuss rhetoric in terms of persuasion. But when Socrates comes to supply his own critical description of rhetoric, persuasion has disappeared. In its place has come the supplying of "gratification" by kolakeia, base flattering or sucking up to the audience. It is this substitution that effects the transformation from the rhetoric that Polus calls beautiful and noble (462E) to the disdained practice that Socrates insists, over and over, is disgusting. What does flattery mean for Socrates?

Aristotle tells us two of the characteristics of the kolax, the flatterer. What the kolax says goes beyond civility, respect and decency and is motivated by a desire to make money at the expense of his listener (N.E. 1127a7). The last distinguishes the servility of the kolax from that of the areskos, the hapless toady. Flattery is a form of servility or self-subordination. It is usually expected from those who are at the bottom of the social heap or from those who, without being there, assume the position of a social inferior for their own purposes (N.E. 1125a).

There is one other thing about the kolax. He lies. For the kolax must disguise his real purposes from his audience. Underneath its appearance of harmony between speaker and audience, rhetoric as flattery is abusive and manipulative and, so, isolates the speaker from his audience. This secretive manipulation is what permits readers to see
in Socrates' charges a rhetoric of someone so isolated from his hearers as to display "a total lack of concern for the hearer and his welfare" (Murray, 1988).

Flattery makes us suspicious. Who believes a speaker who always puts gratification of the listener first? Yet we sometimes do. The flatterer addresses the simpleminded, the feckless and the vain, but it is the simpleminded, the feckless and the vain within each of us. For the fact is that it is difficult to turn away from flattering speech or to regard it for what it is. Flattery would not be so powerful were that not true. We need something that stirs us out of complacent acceptance. The paradox of politics in contemporary America has something to do with the fact that, although many believe that all candidates are mere flatterers and liars, at the same time the disdained candidates may still be elected due to the dangerous sweetness of flattery.

Flattery is not only sweet to the listener, it is a form of persuasion, as we can learn from Aesop or any number of sources. Flattery works because we are distracted by flattery from issues to which we would otherwise attend or because we are pleased by what we hear and do not mind giving something to the speaker to express our pleasure or because, most dangerously, we are flattered into seriously overassessing our own powers and underassessing the task we are considering.

There is a flatterer's form of rhetoric, and such rhetoric is dangerous wherever it is found. But Socrates must go further than this; he must show that it is plausible to speak of such rhetoric as almost co-extensive with speech addressed to the demos. Many would argue that Socrates' argument at this point must depend on an appeal to political assumptions in the form of a radical elitism that few today would openly admit to sharing. I
think it is true to some degree that part of the surface plausibility of Socrates' attack takes the form of an appeal to the social prejudices and anti-democratic convictions of the well-born Athenians for whom Plato was writing.

I disagree, however, that Socrates' attack is based principally on these prejudices and convictions, and I believe that justification for Socrates' attack can be found without departing far from a politics of liberal pluralism. Rhetorical theory can teach a deeper lesson about the rhetor as flatterer, and Socrates may be able, to some extent, to build his condemnation on that lesson.

Persuasive logos is thought to be the way to power for the speaker, and Gorgias has expressly said that it is (452E). The speaker by skill, by words, by argument brings the audience over to a new point-of-view; they accept the speaker's point-of-view and are overcome -- a being overcome that is assimilated to force by Gorgias in the Helen -- and converted by a conviction about its truth that they now find is their own. The power of the political person as speaker, it would appear, lies in her or his ability to substitute, in the minds of his listeners, the opinion he or she chooses for whatever opinion that was previously there. But is that an adequate description of what a speaker does?

The use of persuasive speech may more appropriately be said to rest on the rhetor's weakness in relation to his listeners. This weakness consists, precisely, in her or his dependence on the convictions, values and feelings of the audience. Persuasive speech is an appeal to these, and nothing else. The power of the persuasive speaker in politics or elsewhere is, always, the power of those to whom he speaks and, if he obtains their assent, for whom he speaks. To insist on this turns away from the picture of the rhetor
as powerful. It turns, just as rhetorical theory does, to emphasize the rhetor's dependence on his or her listeners. It is the listeners' desires, aversions and beliefs that give political speech the persuasive force that it has. In the long run, any argument's being accepted is conditioned on the speaker's ability to subordinate or (to soften the fact) accommodate his or her own beliefs and desires to the premises of the audience.

Socrates utters his condemnation of rhetoric in the shadow, as it were, of dialogical behavior by Gorgias that confirms this understanding of persuasion. Thomas Lewis, as I have noted, writes to describe the dynamics of the largely silent (it gives forth applause once or twice), but palpably present audience in this dialogue. According to Lewis, the audience of prospective students and admiring followers of Gorgias have come to hear Gorgias' program. The first part of the program -- Gorgias display pieces -- is completed before the dialogue begins. The second half, Gorgias' answering questions, never takes place because Socrates arrives and deftly hijacks Gorgias' audience. It is to them that Socrates is really speaking, just as Gorgias was and is.

Gorgias is led to remain silent when confronted with the dilemma of whether to accept or reject responsibility for wicked graduates of his tutelage and further led, a few moments later, to intervene on behalf of Socrates' speech; both his remaining silent and the speeches he urges Socrates to make, must be embarrassing to him. In both cases Gorgias seems to be compelled to act as he does. In neither case would he choose to act as he does outside the immediate context within which he acts. He is constrained by the kind of persona that he wishes to project. His silence and subsequent encouragement of Socrates seem plausibly rooted in his sense that Socrates has won over the audience that
originally came to hear Gorgias and now wants to hear what Socrates has to say. It is reluctance to offend this audience that leads him to both actions and, further, to accept Socrates’ polemic with as much good grace as he can.

Gorgias is willing to be embarrassed rather than admit that he is indifferent to teaching his students the ways of justice. But the historical Gorgias was known for insisting on just such indifference, and Plato knew that since he has Meno say it (Meno 95c). So why does Gorgias hesitate now? Dean Kronman of Yale Law School writes that the rhetor cannot afford to be perceived as not sharing in the basic and necessary premises of his audience (Kronman, 1981). This is a version of the argument I have been making about the speaker’s dependence on the listeners, but it adds to my argument a notion that it is especially compelling that feelings and premises be seen to be shared when they form the basis for the rhetorical point be made. I believe that Gorgias has a problem of this sort. He cannot both continue to speak of the unlimited power of rhetoric, to praise rhetoric unconditionally, and to admit that it sends one into the political arena without a fixed politics. Gorgias chooses to remain at one with his audience and suffers through Socrates' polemic as the lesser evil.

This is, I believe, a motive that is sufficient to explain Gorgias’ silence -- what Polus calls the reflex of a shame or a sort of social delicacy. And the motive I have suggested fits in with Socrates' paradox that the strength of rhetoric lies in its weakness and openness to others.

Still Socrates has not justified his argument. If rhetoric depends on a species of flattery, it still remains to be shown that its sort of flattery is as reprehensible as that of the
kolax. At least its reprehensibility remains to be shown if we are not prepared to let the argument rest on the snobbism and elitism of aristocratic Athens. For justification we must turn to what Socrates says about the consequences or at least the serious risks of political rhetoric. This argument is based on what, throughout the rest of the dialogue, he suggests is a psychological truth. He is concerned to show that the advocate, whatever his initial reservations about the case he is making, almost always comes to share the beliefs and convictions of his audience.

A major part of Socrates' attack on rhetoric is based on this psychological insight. This insight, in turn, is supported by the plausible claim that flattery has a reciprocal impact on the flatterer himself; the flatterer may become truly servile from acting servilely. Similarly, the argument goes, the rhetor suffers reciprocal changes in his or her beliefs, values, and character under the impact of the arguments that he or she regularly directs to others. What began as a mere means may bit by bit become more than a mere means. What gratifies the audience comes to gratify the speaker also. Socrates is saying that political life corrupts in a special way. He tries to show that Callicles is corrupted by his passionate pursuit of intimate union with the people as a whole and, more particularly, those who control that whole. Callicles, Socrates twice says, loves the demos of Athens. Callicles agrees, in the end, that he cannot think other than they do (481D, 521B).

On the other hand, it is important to remember that Callicles opens by saying that he hates that powerful beast, the united people or demos, who impose their collective will on the best and brightest people. His love of demos is through and through mixed with this hate and with fear. It is almost as if, to the degree that a political figure believes the
audience must be manipulated -- and so projects a debased audience -- , to that degree is he or she tempted himself or herself to become that debased and projected audience.

The assumption that the flatterer is unchanged in his or her own moral constitution is put into question. Much of the latter part of the *Gorgias* is to be devoted to proving that, far from being in control through persuasive techniques, one moves to that “sincerest” of all forms of flattery. The risk and danger to any political speaker is that of imitating and ultimately assimilating to those who hold the power of decision, the regime, who must be known and addressed if one is to succeed.

Socrates is not saying that tendency cannot be resisted. What is said is that one can hardly gratify others insincerely, but will assimilate to the audience, that is, to that regime. This is the powerful argument that Socrates explicitly makes (510A, 522C), and it plays an important part in supporting Socrates’ condemnation of a rhetoric that has no resources to resist that tendency. If one is to preserve one’s own identity in using persuasive speech, one needs some further aid than can be given by a rhetoric that is not anchored in a larger understanding of politics and language. This is at least one reason why, in Socrates’ eyes, it is important for rhetoric to be grounded in a theoretical part.

Moreover, Socrates’ argument continues, rhetoric may end up *without any power* of calling upon the better natures of the audience, due to the speakers’ overwhelming dependence, for persuasive effect, on keeping listeners self-pleased through flattery, however gross. And as that effort corrupts the speaker to become one more member of his own listeners, resort to criticism (what is now self-criticism) becomes less and less possible.
Socrates provides, throughout the dialogue, an extremely pessimistic reading of Athens' history and its statesmen in support of this claim. The practice of the rhetor who blindly focuses on winning the vote of the people, not only appeals to the worst natures of the listeners, it diminishes and ultimately destroys the souls of the rhetors.

Does this mean that Plato teaches that politics are necessarily corrupting and must be avoided? He certainly teaches at least that politics -- and not only electoral politics -- always lives in the shadow of corruption. He does not, I believe, teach that it must be avoided although he counsels those destined for politics, Glaucon and Adeimantus in the Republic, for example, about the necessarily limited possibilities of politics and the necessity for holding fast to justice.

Socrates' definition and exposition of rhetoric is a polemic against tendencies of existing rhetorical practices when they are employed in a self-interested exploitation of politics, and of the vices of such a politics. It has a force and vehemence that all can feel. And all feel, too, especially we lovers of true rhetoric, that the argument is in many ways tendentious. I have tried to find a way of reading this argument that reduces its tendentiousness. As far as rhetoric is concerned, Socrates brings home the paradox that rhetoric's strength must arise from the bond it presupposes between the speaker and the hearer. He also brings home the inexpugnably real possibility of abuse of that bond. An insufficiently reflective rhetoric, though it grasps the possibilities involved, has no way of separating the questions of what is possible for rhetoric from what are the consequences for political life. Socrates certainly invites his listeners to reflect on these possibilities and, by the very unfairness of the link he suggests between them, to separate rhetoric from an
exploitive politics. The separation in fact is not explored by Polus or Gorgias or, later, by Callicles. The argument turns, unremarked, from rhetoric to politics.
F. What Polus Was Waiting For

With this, I come to the last point in this paper. The discussion of rhetoric is abruptly abandoned once Socrates takes up Polus' argument about power and, thus, removes the constraints that he has imposed on his participation in the dialogue. Socrates has made a massive attack on persuasive political speech and its pretensions. Speech that begins as cynical flattery will end with the speaker's loss of his or her own soul.

Polus does not care at all about anything that Socrates has said. He has not even heard how political life has been invoked, and the forms of flattery multiplied. He only asks, in an amazement that is both spontaneous and rhetorical, whether Socrates is saying rhetoric is flattery. As a result, Socrates can tax him with failing to consider Socrates' exposition in detail. The criticism does not concern him. He has finally reached the point at which he can say what, it is very likely, he has wanted to say from the beginning.

In expressing what he feels deeply, he shortcuts Socrates' need for a proof that rhetoric cannot be considered save in association with political life and justness, mere assertion in the Divided Oblong. Polus shortcuts that need for proof, because he himself supplies the most persuasive proof of all for it. It is not a proof in speech or by argument. It is a dramatic proof.

Polus insists on turning the discussion away from persuasive speech as such -for good, that is, for the rest of the dialogue as it turns out -- and, instead, in the direction of its embodiment in the speech-making participant in politics. In Socrates' Greek, the word for politician and for public speaker are one and the same, that is, rhetor. Polus
unproblematically agrees with Socrates that this by-play of Greek vocabulary well represents the truth of the matter.

Gorgias artfully suggested that his logos and politics -- at least successful politics -- were one and the same. Socrates has separated rhetoric and politics in speech; and by his treatment, first, of rhetoric in the passage we have been reading and, thereafter, of politics in the rest of his discussion with Polus and subsequently with Callicles, Socrates has given a concrete example of their separateness. Now Polus opens up the second part of Socrates’ project, that of politics as such, although still with reference to the work of rhetoric. Socrates’ proposal of the separateness/togetherness of rhetoric and politics now turns out to be an opinion that Socrates and Polus share in common. Socrates can turn to exploring Polus’ single and powerful argument, that the nature of politics requires a self-protective politics of flattery and power-seeking. This establishes forcefully, at least within the discourse of the dialogue, that an interest in rhetoric cannot be too long separated from an interest in justice, the law and politics.

At the same time this concessive agreement on Polus’ part prevents an adequate investigation of Socrates' condemnation of rhetoric and of the room, which that attack leaves, for a defense of what is good about rhetoric that we, as lovers of rhetoric, so passionately desire to make. On the basis of the reading I have made, it may even be the case that Plato and Plato’s Socrates also desire that that defense of rhetoric be made.


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