Modal fictionalism and modal instrumentalism Organon F (22) 4 2015. A discussion of the Brock-Rosen argument that modal fictionalism fails, and a demonstration that modal instrumentalism does better. The lesson applies to properties as well.
Conscious Intentions Topics in Cognitive Science 2012. Argues against Prinz' thesis that all consciousness is perceptual.
Is More Objective Reality Really Something More? Philosophiegeschichte und Logische Analyse, 5 (January, 2002). On Descartes' Third Meditation proof of God's existence.
A "no causal rivalry" solution to the problem of mental causation Acta Analytica 2002.
Individualism and the New Logical Connections Argument Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2002.
Against Sparse Properties Acta Analytica, 19 (1997).
How the Radically Intepreted Make Mistakes Dialogue, 33 (1994). On the problems of error and semantic normativity in Donald Davidson's philosophy of language.
Sunburn: Independence Conditions on Causal Relevance Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. LIII, no. 3, September 1993.
Property Instrumentalism and Metaphysical Satisfaction On Barry Stroud's argument about metaphysical dissatisfaction: I argue that being an instrumentalist about properties is a reasonable position, even though we cannot give up talking about properties. (Presentation for 2016 Society for Exact Philosophy meeting, University of Miami.)
Carnap on Ontology On Carnap's view in "Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology", with discussion of Stroud's, Friedman's and Quine's Carnap. Concludes that the internal/external questions doctrine cannot do the work required of it in ontology. (2015).
Is ontology easy? On Amie Thomasson's account of ontology as "easy". Concludes that ontology is not easy. (2015).
Property Instrumentalism An attempt at a broad evaluation of property instrumentalism (2014)
A structure for mental causation The overlap structure as a way to solve the mental causation problem (2012)
Going Meta on Mental Causation Mental causation and property instrumentalism (2010)
Supervenience, Properties and Mental Causation How to solve the mental causation problem (conference presentation for SEP 2008).
'C'ing is believing? 1996 A counterexample to Fodor's Asymmetric Dependency account of representation
Kitty Thoughts Chapter 2 from my 1990 dissertation.
Representation and Rationality 1990 UC Berkeley dissertation.
Some notes on the words "aware" and "conscious" 1984 comments on David Rosenthal's higher-order thought account of consciousness.