Is More Objective Reality Really Something More? Philosophiegeschichte und Logische Analyse, 5 (January, 2002). On Descartes' Third Meditation proof of God's existence.
A "no causal rivalry" solution to the problem of mental causation Acta Analytica 2002.
Individualism and the New Logical Connections Argument Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2002.
Against Sparse Properties Acta Analytica, 19 (1997).
How the Radically Intepreted Make Mistakes Dialogue, 33 (1994). On the problems of error and semantic normativity in Donald Davidson's philosophy of language.
Sunburn: Independence Conditions on Causal Relevance Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. LIII, no. 3, September 1993.
Going Meta on Mental Causation Talk of properties is certified by the non-empirical substructure of a total theory of everything: in other words, you can talk literally about properties, and say true things, and still not be committed to the existence of properties.
Supervenience, Properties and Mental Causation How to solve the mental causation problem (conference presentation for SEP 2008).
'C'ing is believing? 1996 A counterexample to Fodor's Asymmetric Dependency account of representation
Kitty Thoughts Chapter 2 from my 1990 dissertation.
Representation and Rationality 1990 UC Berkeley dissertation.
Some notes on the words "aware" and "conscious" 1984 comments on David Rosenthal's higher-order thought account of consciousness.